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Abstract 
 
The ongoing disputes in the South China Sea have gained international attention in the recent 
years as a number of bordering states continue to fight over territory and sovereignty claims 
of the contested Spratly Islands. China and the Philippines are among the claimant states 
whose foreign policy is largely driven by dynamics coming from the external environment. 
This study delves into issues concerning the role of domestic dynamics on the contemporary 
Philippine political and economic relations with China under the administrations of former 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) and current President Benigno S. Aquino III 
(2010-2016). This study argues that despite of the strong influence on the foreign policy 
choices, brought by national power and state’s position in the international system, domestic 
dynamics can also shape the Philippine foreign policy and its outcomes. President Arroyo’s 
friendly relationship with China is represented through bilateral diplomatic relations and 
economic partnerships, whereas the Aquino III’s “antagonistic” relationship with China is 
guided by geopolitics with US’ involvement and multilateral and legal strategy at the UN 
Tribunal. This qualitative study employs a method of textual analysis of data gathering. 
Among the main strategies used, include documentary research, news analysis, and reviewed 
scholarly works relevant for the topic of this study. Several materials like journals, newspaper 
articles, books, particularly about political economy, foreign policy and diplomacy, history, 
and social sciences have been collected from libraries, official documents and government 
websites. The theory of neoclassical realism guides the understanding of the problem of this 
study as it seeks to explain how, why and under what condition domestic dynamics shapes 
the foreign policy. The concept of security dilemma is used to describe the phenomenon 
under which states operate in the international system. This study concludes that the 
significant role of states’ domestic dynamics in any conflict management or resolution 
mechanisms should be highly considered because they can alter the balance of peace and 
stability in the international system.    
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1. Introduction  
The world has witnessed how some countries in Asia have squabbled over territories in the 
South China Sea for several decades. The South China Sea (SCS) row became an 
internationally observed issue. It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas 
where a number of bordering countries have laid claims in whole or in part of the contested 
Spratly Island groups. Among the claimant states include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Brunei and the Philippines. Claims are based on a complex mixture of historic, legal and 
physical characteristics. All of the claimant states assert to have territorial and sovereignty 
claims, particularly over rights to exploit the uninhabited regions that are believed to have 
great reserves of natural resources around them. These special rights to marine resources and 
energy exploration and production are enclosed in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The 
Convention suggests that a claimant state’s EEZ outwardly spans 200 nautical miles from the 
coast of its main territory. 
While the influx of literatures about the South China Sea disputes talk about how the issue 
can be best managed or at least mitigated, only a few talks about how domestic variables of 
claimant states contribute to the exacerbation of the disputes in the international system. A 
state’s international affairs are not solely driven by forces coming from the external 
environment, but forces coming from the domestic level, which may also alter the flow of 
international outcomes through foreign policies that states pursue internationally. Foreign 
policy, as defined by Christopher Hill (2003), is a “purposive action with the view towards 
promoting the interests of a single political community or state”. Generally, Encyclopedia 
Britannica defines foreign policy as “general or universal objectives, intentions or goals 
pursued by one state to guide its dealings with other states”. It is considered as a “general” or 
“universal” guide because foreign policy is developed from complicated domestic 
considerations, policies of other states in question, or plans to pursue certain national goals in 
the international realm. Therefore, in understanding possible reasons behind the behaviour of 
states that operate in the international system towards systemic pressures and incentives, it is 
important to also look at their internal characteristics that influence their behaviour. 
Of all the claimant states, China is the most proactive. The economic development of China 
is an important determining factor on policies it pursues internationally. China lays claims to 
almost all of the SCS as reflected from its nine-dash line claims. On the other hand, the 
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Philippines is considered as the most aggressive and vocal to challenge China’s claims in the 
SCS. The Philippines made claims of a historic nature of the Spratly Islands, while at the 
same time invoking the rules laid out in UNCLOS. The Philippines, like other claimants, 
have installations on their claimed territories, but nothing on the scale of China’s reclamation.  
Although other less powerful claimant states have expressed discontent towards China’s 
assertions in the SCS, only the Philippines has challenged China by filing a legal case in the 
United Nations International Court of Arbitration, questioning its nine-dash line claims. The 
Philippines is perceived as an ultimate ‘game changer’ in the disputes, a small country going 
against its giant neighbour (Bautista 2014, pp. 3-24). 
The China-Philippines island disputes are greatly shaped by the rising apprehensions about 
the rise of China as a regional economic and military power. Many scholars, like John 
Mearsheimer (2014), Scott Snyder (2009), John Ikenberry (2008) and Elisabeth Economy 
(2005) have argued that China’s economic rise has permitted it to pursue a greater role on the 
international arena, particularly in Southeast Asia where its diplomatic influence is strongly 
felt and has profound implications for the balance of power. With the system of anarchy 
under which states operate and the rising economic and military capabilities of China, a 
security dilemma in the APR emerges. Security dilemma is a condition wherein the 
enhancement of a state’s own security for defensive purposes fuels the insecurity of other 
states, thus creates uncertainty (Mearsheimer 2014). Uncertainty produces fear and suspicions 
that cause states to implement policies that may appear threatening towards other states and 
inevitably, diminish their own security. 
Efforts in countering Chinese aggression in the SCS seemingly become the focus of attention 
by the current Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III administration. In the beginning of 
2010, more aggressive approaches in its dealings with China in the SCS have been central to 
the Philippine foreign policy. President Aquino III’s strengthened diplomacy to counter 
China is reflected in the stronger security ties of the Philippines with the US who is also the 
country’s long time ally, the implementation of the modernization programme for the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines and the ongoing legal battle in the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
that challenges China’s claims in the SCS. President Aquino’s predecessor, the former 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, however, pursued a friendlier and accommodating 
attitude towards China during her presidency, especially on China’s demands in the SCS. The 
differences in the behaviour of the Philippines towards China under these two presidents have 
clear ramifications for the future of the China-Philippines relations.          
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 1.1 Problem Statement 
The ongoing territorial disputes in the SCS for several decades have profound implications to 
the regional stability in the APR. Just as China-Philippines bilateral relations follow disorder 
brought by series of incidents in the SCS, this study answers as to how and why have 
territorial and maritime disputes in the SCS impacted on the economic and political relations 
of the Philippines with China. This study delves deeply into issues concerning the China-
Philippines territorial and maritime disputes in the SCS. The behaviour of the Philippines 
towards China is greatly affected by the intense power competition in the international 
system as explained by the balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001). But domestic level 
variables may also intervene and influence the behaviour of the state through the policies it 
pursues in the system (Lobell et al 2009). This qualitative study explores the role of domestic 
dynamics in shaping the Philippines’ national interests that drives the foreign policy towards 
China under President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010) and President Benigno S. 
Aquino III (2010-2016) administrations.  
This study employs the concept of security dilemma to explain the phenomenon of the 
renewed tensions between the two states following the Chinese occupation of the Mischief 
Reef in the SCS, which is a territory also claimed by the Philippines. The theory of 
neoclassical realism guides the analysis of domestic level variables, such as decisions-
making, decision-makers, complex processes, events, bureaucratic bargaining, as well as the 
utilization of national resources, in shaping the Philippine foreign policy towards China. This 
study argues that the domestic dynamics of the Philippines can shape its foreign policy and 
its outcomes. This is empirically evident in the study of the Arroyo and Aquino III 
administrations. This study finds that the Arroyo administration’s friendly relationship with 
China is represented through bilateral diplomatic relations and economic partnerships, 
whereas the Aquino III’s “antagonistic” relationship with China is guided by geopolitics with 
US’ involvement and multilateral and legal strategy at the UN Tribunal. 
In the context of the South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines, the 
uncertainty brought by a security dilemma exacerbates the already complex situation between 
the two states. The economic and military advancement of China threatens the Philippines’ 
own survival. The unavailability of accurate information or perception about other states’ real 
intention produces fear and suspicions among states, and thus exacerbates security dilemma. 
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It is apparent that states do not react similarly to the same objective external situations, but a 
state’s internal characteristics can also shape a state’s foreign policy and its outcomes. 
 
1.2 Research Purpose 
The SCS disputes have raised questions and concerns about the threatened regional stability 
that seemed likely to intensify due to the territorial disputes between China and several other 
countries in Asia. Apparently, the Philippines became the most assertive claimant state to 
challenge China’s claims despite of being amongst the many states in world whose military 
capability is most under-funded and poorly equipped. Moreover, the Philippines brought an 
arbitral case against China under the auspices of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), which allows any parties to submit any dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of such Convention. This study reveals different domestic and international level 
dynamics that influence the attitude of the state in question towards international events. 
Territorial conflict on disputed islands in the Asia Pacific Region (APR) is not new to the 
Philippines. However, several changes have occurred over times, particularly in the level of 
external threats towards the country’s national security, the kind of national goals being 
pursued internationally to counter threats or to benefit from external opportunities, as well as 
changes in the roles of influential actors or institutions involve in critical domestic processes.  
The purpose of this study is mainly to understand how and why domestic dynamics impact 
the foreign policy behaviour of a state under a given circumstance at a given time. I argue 
that states do not react or behave similarly on the same situations and that its internal 
characteristics also affect how it responds to external threats and possibilities. This study 
explores, describe, and explain events, processes and policies related to the SCS conflict that 
constitute direct impacts on the economic and political behaviour of the Philippines towards 
China. The goal is to show the differences in the administration of former President Arroyo 
and current President Aquino III and to draw special attention on domestic and external 
factors that give rise to the exacerbation of the disputes between China and the Philippines, 
especially about how political frictions and mistrust among major actors affect the internal 
assessments and construction of the Philippine foreign policy towards China.  
This study identifies key differences or patterns on the behaviour of the Philippines, say how 
domestic actors or drivers have successfully managed in promoting the Philippines’ national 
interests in its relations with China, or are any major constraints to the attainment of more 
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desirable outcomes. Furthermore, what these outcomes suggested that have implications for 
the study of international relations.         
 
  1.3 Focus of the Study  
This study deals with the foreign relations of the Philippines towards China in light of the 
territorial and maritime disputes between these two countries in the SCS. The focus of the 
study is a comparison of foreign policies between the former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (from 2001-2010) and President Benigno S. Aquino III (from 2010-2016) 
administrations. This study highlights the strategic and economic significance of disputed 
territories in driving the conflict between the two countries, thus influences the construction 
of the Philippine national interests, which drives its foreign policy towards China. The 
comparison between the two governments is relevant in distinguishing significant events, 
actions, policies and other nuances that have influenced any major developments and patterns 
in shaping the Philippine foreign policy across time under given similar constraints.  
I argue that the Arroyo government promotes economic and development cooperation with 
China in a more relaxed and friendly drives, whereas the relation of the Aquino III 
government with China is strained by involving the US to counter the balance of threat and 
bringing the solution of their conflict to arbitration. Their respective foreign policy strategies 
towards China differ, because of the changing phenomenon in the international system to 
which they operate and the intervening forces in the domestic level that shape the country’s 
foreign policy. Externally, new developments have occurred over the years, such as the 
spread of terrorism, the rise of new power (like China) and the decline of great power (like 
the US) in areas of diplomacy, policy, economy or security, and the challenges they pose in 
the regional status quo in APR. They determine the level of threat and interdependence that 
the Philippines can tolerate at a given time and circumstance, as well as which national 
interests to prioritize and pursue externally.  
 
 1.4 Methodology 
This chapter outlines a systematic way of how the research problem is solved. It explains how 
the methods of research design, data collection and analysis best fit the research problem, and 
how the underlying issues of accessibility and limitations of the research approach used affect 
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the problem being studied. In addition, this section explains the reliability and credibility of 
the study. 
 
1.4.1 Qualitative Research Design 
Research approaches refer to plans and procedures for research that describe which steps to 
take in collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data (Creswell 2014, pp. 3-4). A research 
approach is selected based on the nature of the research problem or issue being addressed, as 
well as the audience for the study that accept the research (Ibid). The research problem of this 
study calls for a qualitative research design that allows an in-depth analysis and closer look of 
the processes and meanings which cannot be measured in quantity or frequency. Generally, a 
qualitative research can be distinguished from another type of research design called 
quantitative research by looking at the basic philosophical assumptions researchers bring to 
study, the types of strategies used, and the specific methods employed in conducting these 
strategies (National Science Foundation). 
A qualitative research design is used in this study because it provides basis and tools for 
exploring, understanding and interpreting social, political and human phenomena. Given the 
nature of the research problem of this study, qualitative research provides a more realistic 
feeling and views of the world, events, actions or policies that cannot be experienced in any 
numerical or statistical data. This study collects and analyzes data on politicians’ speeches, 
government rhetoric, diplomatic letters, or a budget for certain project. And because these are 
information that anyone could easily relate to than numerical ones, the extent of interpretation 
is greater. Furthermore, with the use of qualitative research, it is easy to understand the aim 
of one’s action by being exploratory in interpreting them through triangulation and to relay 
the message of such action with the use of senses. Qualitative research allows researchers to 
investigate selections of cases through observation, interviews, case studies, and discourse 
analysis (Berg & Lune 2012, pp. 11-14). However, certain types of methods are not 
applicable to certain types of cases, such as the method of observation cannot be applied to 
historical cases. 
 
1.4.2 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
This study employs a method of textual analysis of data collection. Alan McKee (2003, p.1) 
defines textual analysis as a way of gathering information about how the world is being 
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interpreted by other human beings. A text is something that we make meaning from and 
serves as the material reality that allows for the recovery and critical interrogation of 
discursive politics in an “empirical” form (Ibid). It can be a film, television programmes, 
magazines, news or scholarly articles, social media, and so on (Ibid, p.4). The main strategies 
for this study includes documentary research, news analysis, and reviewed works of scholars 
in fields of economy, diplomacy and even on military sphere. The sources of data includes 
official documentaries, TV and newspaper interviews, books about history, security studies, 
political economy, foreign policies and diplomacy, international organizations and 
conventions, and other social science-based books which are relevant to the chosen topic. 
Dictionaries and encyclopedias are also used, as well as journals and photos that were 
published by primary sources. These data can be accessed from internet, books, and former 
lectures at school, fellow students, and supervisors who have access to relevant materials 
needed for this study. The library is also a good place to gather data, particularly in doing a 
research project in an academic setting, mainly because of their wide ranging sources that are 
accessible to students. The Norwegian University of Life Sciences and public libraries in 
Oslo also provide this study with reliable and wide access to academic literatures.  
By performing a textual analysis on a text, one makes an educated guess at some of the most 
likely interpretations that might be made of that text (McKee 2003, p. 89). Likely 
interpretations produce by different authors or audiences are collected for this study to 
usefully analyze the nature of people’s interactions, events, programmes, or experiences. This 
study compares different texts that are explicitly linked to one another in order to get a clear 
understanding on the correct interpretations of texts and to find the meaning that these texts 
want to portray.  
 
1.4.3 Strengths and Limitations 
It is an advantage that this study employs a qualitative research design, as it provides tools 
that are relevant and necessary in the analysis of data and the interpretation of results, which 
determines whether or not the research problem of this study has been answered. Some the 
strengths of using textual analysis on a text include the condition to which it allows me to 
interrogate the texts itself by questioning the ideology at work on that text, the language that 
is used, the context to which is written, as well as the power relations in play, like how the 
author of a text position herself/himself in a way that my own interpretation is greatly 
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influenced, or worst, manipulated. By reflecting on the texts, I am able to ask myself about 
who is doing what to whom or to whose great interests a text is made for. This is reflected 
mainly on news articles that are used for this study. Texts are socially constructed, thus 
promotes neutrality, but looking at it on a positive side, text is relatable, because contexts can 
be found in reality or in a phenomenon where I also exist. Moreover, texts can be easily 
narrated when I read or hear them first hand from original its original sources. 
The process or cross checking two or more texts increases the validity and reliability of the 
results and findings of this study. Thus, it is an advantage for this study to have numerous 
sources to compare and verify one data to another. Triangulation helps reduce biases and 
increases the probability of establishing valid interpretations. However, the process itself is 
time consuming. Therefore, it constitutes a lot of work on my part as a researcher, but I 
triangulate texts and link them together to the best of my ability given the time allocated for 
this study. Other texts employ in this study create some stereotypes that at times influence the 
way I see or assess particular actors, events or trends. Also, other texts create signals that can 
be interpreted differently by its audiences, but I try my best not to fall in this dilemma by 
cross checking each text and its sources. The method of analysis of this study also open doors 
for my personal innovation, as I get to introduce to new ideas that have influenced my 
creative thinking, particularly about the focus of this study.   
In order to achieve a considerably valid analysis, interpretations of texts are done in a neutral 
manner. Through transparency and reflection throughout the analytical process, I avoid 
making biased interpretations by providing data that represent the side of every party 
involves in this study. However, certain factors inevitably influence my own understanding of 
events or happenings relevant to the issue of study. Occasionally, I am challenge of 
confirming my ability to analyze and interpret things well and to ensure that my own 
interpretations are, if not consistent or accurate, at least not far to that of the original sources. 
Also, when doing the analysis, I reflect on the possibility of influencing the research with my 
personal opinions, emotions and experiences, which possibly leads to irrelevant conclusions. 
Nevertheless, I consider the value of self-awareness, particularly throughout the analytical 
process in order to provide reliable results. With the volume of data collected, the processes 
of selecting data that share almost the same interpretations of a particular text, as well as the 
analysis and interpretations is time consuming.  
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This study reckons the inclusion of some external dynamics in the analysis section that may 
overlap other dynamics and therefore confuse the readers. For example, the discussion on the 
role of the US in the China-Philippines relations may overlaps with the US’ role in the 
Mischief Reef incident. Nevertheless, I ensure that both the international and domestic 
dynamics are included in every discussion to comply with the requirement of applying the 
theory to my empirical evidences.  
In this study, it is crucial to distinguish my own interpretations of texts from the 
interpretation taken from other sources. Some of the texts used are paraphrased, although 
some are with direct quotations, which represent greater accuracy. Nevertheless, a deeper 
analysis or accurate interpretations of different texts are in the analysis section, where I also 
showcase my own perceptions of data collected. 
 
1.4.4 Data Reliability and Validity 
There is a general consensus for qualitative inquirers to demonstrate the credibility of their 
studies by establishing validity in their works (Creswell, 2000, pp. 124-30). Thomas 
Schwandt (cited in Creswell and Miller, 2000) defines validity as to how accurate the account 
represents participants’ realities of the social phenomena and is credible to them. Thus, 
validity is not only limited to the data collected, but also refers to the processes and strategies 
researchers have used in order to establish the credibility of their research. Having this in 
mind, this study employs a narrative account where evidences are collected primarily through 
multiple methods, such as interviews, observations, or questionnaires that significantly 
contribute to the reliability and credibility of this study. The nature of the problem presented 
and the aim of this study requires a more in depth deliberation of different factors that may 
have influenced the emergence of the problem in question. This is why there is a need to 
consider the application of different methods of data collection used by my sources in order 
to increase the probability of answering my research problem. Furthermore, this study go 
through a process of sorting systematically all the data interpreted by various authors in 
relation to the research problem of this study and find common themes among them. 
Different texts are sorted out according to how clear the connections are to each other, or in 
other words, finding out the most likely interpretations produced by different authors or 
audiences.  
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As mentioned in the preceding chapter, this study applies the process of triangulation, where 
multiple sources of data are collected, analyzed and compared with each other. By comparing 
data from multiple sources, it is easy to identify whether or not these sources share the same 
interpretations and results of a particular text. Most likely interpretations increase the 
transferability of data, which is also a relevant criterion in measuring the validity of a 
research. I choose the best data out of the triangulation process, the right approach and 
methods of data collection that help in answering my research problem and to generate 
conclusions. Qualitative method requires that the data collected are reliable and represents 
truth value when findings are tested. This study ensures that the accurate description of the 
analysis matches with the original data used in this study. Also evidences are used to support 
my analysis, which help increase the credibility of this study. Evidently, the research 
approach, methods employed and data used address the issue of applicability, which is 
another criterion for reliability (Krefting, 1991, p.216).   
 It should be noted also that this study is free from bias in its research procedures and results. 
To exercise neutrality of data, this study is using several varieties of sources that follow the 
demand of reliability, like books, academic literatures, documentaries, or official government 
websites. News articles are also used, but I try my best to be very cautious of the real 
intention behind every article since news articles are very subjective and do not follow ethical 
procedures like scholarly articles do. Meanwhile, I am also open to the possibility of being 
accused as biased considering that my country of origin is the Philippines, and this topic is 
mainly concerned about the Philippine foreign policy towards China in relation to their 
widely talked disputes. I, otherwise, try to exercise fairness and avoid discriminatory or 
derogatory comments as possible. Valuable data that represent China’s voice on this matter 
are also used. Importantly, this study shows confidence in its findings, as it manage to answer 
the research problem.  
 
1.4.5 Structure of the Study 
Having presented the research question, this study proceeds as follows: In chapter 2, this 
study explains the rationale for choosing the concept of security dilemma and the theory of 
neoclassical realism, as well as the theory and concept themselves. The fundamental core 
assumptions of security dilemma and neoclassical realism that derived from different 
theoretical approaches of realism serve as guides to best present the research problem and 
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purpose of this study. The concept of security dilemma is presented with a focus on the 
construction of threat and uncertainty among states operating in an anarchical environment. 
Also, this guides the comprehension of “China threat” in the Asia Pacific Region and the 
analysis of renewed tensions between the Philippines and China. In the same way, the theory 
of neoclassical realism talks about the role of domestic variables in the formation of a state’s 
foreign policy with a focus on decision-making, decision-makers, certain processes, episodes 
and conditions that affect foreign policy and its outcomes. Neoclassical realism theory guides 
the analysis of how the Philippines respond to external threats and opportunities brought by 
the SCS disputes under the given domestic variables that may intervene in shaping its foreign 
policy.  
Chapter 3 provides the historical and contemporary contexts of the SCS disputes. First, this 
study presents other littoral states that also lay claim on some parts of the SCS apart from 
China and the Philippines by providing a map showing the areas of disputes. It illustrates 
how one state’s claims overlap those of others’. Secondly, a background on the China-
Philippines island disputes shows emphasis on the number of land features inhabited by 
claimant states in the contested Spratly Island group. This chapter touches the important 
event of Mischief Reef’s occupation by China that marked the beginning of the Philippines’ 
pursuit of defensive measures against China. In addition, this chapter highlights the strategic 
and economic interests of the Philippines in the SCS, summarized as follows: great oil 
reserves are a key to boost Philippine economy and reduce oil imports dependency; great 
fishing capacity can address food insecurity and bloom into a multi-billion dollar industry; 
and the Freedom of Navigation provides a gateway in achieving national development and 
security. In order to illustrate the great demand for oil by the Philippines, data on the 
Philippines’ total production and consumption of Petroleum and other liquids (from 2011-
2014) are provided. The economic and strategic significance of the SCS are relevant in 
understanding the determinants of the national interests of Philippines that drives its foreign 
policy towards China. Finally, this chapter presents the claims and bases of claims of the 
Philippines on features in the Spratlys. It specifically presents the stand of the Philippines on 
the disputes as well as the challenges that the country faces internationally.  
Chapter 4 contains the analysis and discussion where the chosen concept and theory, as well 
as the methods used for this study are put together in order to obtain relevant data that simply 
provide an answer to problems under study. I have four key sub-chapters under this section: 
The first part contains a brief explanation as to how the Philippines’ bilateral relations with 
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China, as well as with the US have developed. This explains the role of the US in the 
construction of the Philippine foreign policy, particularly in the China-Philippines dispute. I 
argue that the US, China, Philippines triangle is an important strategic relationship in the 
world of politics. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the role of the rise of China in 
exacerbating the security dilemma in the region. This study observes that China’s rise 
constructs threat and uncertainty, thus increases the vulnerability of the Philippines in 
surviving in the international arena.  Moreover, threats and uncertainties influence the design 
of states’ national interests that drives their foreign policy.  
Third, this study includes the analysis of the role of the Mischief Reef occupation by China in 
reviving the ailing US-Philippines security alliance. This extends to the complex systemic 
and domestic decision-making processes that lead to the revival of the US-Philippines 
alliance. Fourth, this presents the Arroyo Administration (2001-2010). This deals with issues 
surrounding the more relaxed, calmed, and friendly relations of the Philippine government 
with China in the midst of the SCS disputes. This highlights the bilateral diplomatic relations 
and economic partnership between China and the Philippines. And the last sub-chapter of this 
section talks about the antagonistic relations between China and the Philippines under the 
administration of President Benigno S. Aquino III (2010-2016). This section talks about how 
the failed Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking agreement caused antagonism and mistrust of 
the Philippines towards China. In addition, this study discusses the Scarborough Shoal 
tension followed by economic sanctions imposed by China towards the Philippines, 
particularly targeting the Banana Industry and Tourism Industry. Apparently, these sanctions 
have influenced the compliance of the Philippines towards China, but the Philippines employ 
a more aggressive approach by involving the US to balance the power and by suing China in 
the Internal Court of Arbitration.        
Chapter five contains the summary and conclusion of the problem, the main findings and the 
discussion of findings. This chapter provides a conclusion whether the researcher has 
answered the research problem or not and identifies the implications of this study for the 
people working in the field of international relations (IR) or the IR theory itself. The 
researcher concludes in which direction further research should go in relevance to either the 
theory used or the topic being studied. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter discusses the theoretical frameworks employed for this study. The theory of 
neoclassical realism guides the understanding of the research problem. It explains how 
domestic variables of the Philippines also influence the formation of its foreign strategies, 
thus generate change in the Philippines-China conflict in the SCS. The validity, plausibility, 
applicability or aptness of the theory used is dependent on empirical evidences and the level 
of its theory development.  
 
  2.1 Neoclassical Realism  
This chapter follows a neoclassical realist approach to international relations. Neoclassical 
realism is a variant of realism, and blossomed from the commitments invested by scholars, 
like Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer in discovering and providing 
rational approaches to best understand international politics. This theory explains how or why 
states respond to international pressures and possibilities at a given time. To introduce the 
theory of neoclassical realism, this study begins by uncovering different theoretical 
approaches of realism starting from the works of their well-known proponents and explain 
how neoclassical realists attempt to bridge the gap between the international system and the 
state. Importantly, this chapter also explains why neoclassical realism theory is employed to 
this study. 
Realism has a very long theoretical tradition since the twentieth century, which includes the 
famous works of Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes - the founding 
fathers of realism. Realism may be known to have numerous divisions, but according to 
Steven Lobell (2009) its heirs speak of a coherent tradition that encompasses the following 
first principles and core assumptions (pp. 4-5): 
(i) Human beings cannot survive on their own, but rather as members of larger groups, 
wherein their loyalty is required as they are provided with the necessary security 
from external enemies; 
(ii) The international system is characterized by the system of anarchy – the absence of a 
higher authority which will govern the entire system; 
(iii)Power is indispensable in securing one’s goals, whether those goals are universal 
domination or simply self-preservation; and 
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(iv) Politics is a perpetual struggle among self-interested groups when scarcity and 
uncertainty are in question. Scarce commodities might be material capabilities or 
social resources, such as prestige and status. 
There are two outstanding realist theories: the classical realism whose pioneers include Hans 
Morgenthau, E.H. Carr and John Hertz and the structural realism or neorealism whose 
pioneers were Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Classical realism is concerned 
primarily with the sources of national power of a state and how it can be utilized in 
international politics (Morgenthau 1968). It also deals with issues faced by state leaders in 
conducting foreign policy, that is why greater attention were given to power distributions 
among states, as well as their relation to domestic society (Ibid). However, classical realists 
like Kissinger, Morgenthau, and Wolfers have underestimated the constraints brought by the 
international system. As a result, Waltz (1979) merged realism with a system-level theory, 
which he later coined as ‘neorealism’, arguing that the structure of the international system is 
the force that drives the behaviour of states towards each other and creates recurring patterns 
of the systemic outcomes over time.  
Among the big issues neorealism attempts to address include, different reasons on the 
occurrence of war, the logic of the balance of power, and the difficult and temporary concept 
of cooperation between states (Baylis, et al. 2014). Generally, neorealism argues that 
‘anarchy’ is a fundamental characteristic of the international system that fosters fear, 
jealousy, suspicion, and insecurity (Hoffman 1963), which compel states to pursue a self-help 
system by enhancing their competitive advantage and their probability of survival (Waltz 
1979). It includes some general assumptions about the motivations of individual states, but it 
failed to provide a detailed explanation on how these states will likely to respond to 
constraints and incentives posed by the system under given circumstances and time. This 
failure was noted in the writings of Waltz when he asked the question about how a theory of 
foreign policy should be constructed when both system-level and unit level forces are in play. 
Given such perspectives, the theory of neoclassical realism was developed. Neoclassical 
realism is classified as a theory more interested in explaining a detailed account of a states’ 
foreign policy behaviour at a given time and situation. This term was originally coined by 
Gideon Rose (1998) in his 1998 World Politics review article, in which he argues that: 
“…the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is initially driven by 
the country’s relative material power. However, the impact of power 
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capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex. The system cannot be 
directly influenced due to the systemic pressures that need to be translated 
through intervening unit-level variables, such as decision-makers’ perceptions 
and state structure” (pp.144-177). 
“Neoclassical realism therefore, seeks to explain why, how, and under what conditions the 
internal characteristics of states may intervene between the assessment of international threats 
and opportunities by state leaders and the policies they pursue in areas of diplomacy, military, 
and foreign economy” (Taliafero, et al. 2009, pp.4-5). It contends that despite of the strong 
influence on foreign policy choices, brought by national power and states’ position in the 
international system, domestic variables can also shape a state’s foreign policy. Nicholas 
Kitchen ( 2010) notes that “the interpretation of key domestic actors about the international 
distribution of power influences how decisions are made domestically, particularly about 
which set of national policies can both set out the goals of the state in international politics 
and prescribe how a broad range of its national capabilities should be utilized in pursuit of 
those goals”. Policies and decisions must be mediated by statesmen’s goals, calculations and 
perceptions (Ibid). Given the system of anarchy, the seriousness of external threats and the 
scarcity of one’s national resources, states must be able to identify or establish which threats 
should be addressed urgently and interests to be prioritized.  
Gideon Rose’s work on neoclassical realism does not intend to create an even larger gap 
between the classical and neorealist thoughts, but rather to build a bridge that will connect the 
international system and the state. Neorealism and neoclassical realism both begin with the 
assumptions about the conflictual nature of politics, the centrality of conflict groups, and the 
importance of relative power distributions (Taliafero, et al. 2009, pp. 4-5). They both assign 
relative power distributions as an independent variable, but differ on the range of phenomena 
they each seeks to explain or dependent variable (Ibid). While neorealism focuses on 
explaining recurring patterns of international outcomes, such as the likelihood of wars, power 
balancing and alliances, neoclassical realism focuses on explaining the variation in the 
foreign policy of a state across time under similar external constraints. The neoclassical 
realist theory does not suggests which of the two levels, international or national, is more 
important than the other  in the analysis of a state’s foreign policy. Rather, the significance of 
both levels may vary from one issue area to another. 
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The SCS conflict between the Philippines and China is not solely driven by the power 
competition existing in the international arena exacerbated by the issue of security dilemma. 
Rather, there are some forces on the domestic level that also influence the foreign policy 
behaviour of the Philippines towards China, as well as the outcomes of this behaviour. With 
the help of the theory of neoclassical realism, this study investigates the Philippines’ 
decision-making, individual decision-makers, threat assessments or perceptions, how 
interests are ranked, the timing, processes and conditions that affect the foreign policy 
formation. By going through these domestic variables this study can determine and measure 
the extent to which the Philippines contribute to the existing problem in the SCS and to also 
guide possible avenues that can help mitigate the existing problem. This study looks at the 
intervening variables, such as the role of leadership, the bureaucracy and interest groups in 
setting the Philippine foreign agenda, say how non-state actors can generate change 
internationally and under what conditions.   
Significantly, neoclassical realism can explain how the Philippines’ perceptions and 
assessments of threats and opportunities brought about by China’s activities in the SCS affect 
the implementation of its own foreign policy at a given time and circumstances. This theory 
guides the analysis of the Philippines’ complex decision-making processes, particularly on 
issues that concern the assessment of the country’s national power being co-extensive to its 
national interests, which interests should be prioritized at a given time, how to counter 
external threats, as well as how past experiences should influence the present foreign policy 
formation of the Philippines towards China. By putting the Philippines’ internal 
characteristics into consideration (as explained by the theory of neoclassical realism) when 
addressing the research problem of this study, it is helpful to understand the phenomenon 
under study. 
 
  2.2 Conceptual Framework 
This study presents the conceptual framework which explains the phenomenon and shows the 
relationship of different constructs under study. 
 
2.2.1 The Security Dilemma 
A security dilemma describes a situation in which military competition, arms race or even 
wars can occur between two or more states operating in an anarchical environment (Hertz 
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1950, pp.157-180). Under anarchy, states ultimately rely on themselves to achieve security 
because there is no supreme authority to counter the use of force by one state on another 
state. However, in the course of enhancing one’s own security, the state in question 
automatically fuels the insecurity of other states. As Wheeler and Booth (cited in Baylis  et al. 
2014, pp. 108-9) argued “security dilemma often exists when one state increases its military 
power or seeks alliances with other powerful states, creating uncertainty in the mind of 
another state as to whether such preparations are for “defensive” or “offensive” purposes 
only”. Defensive purposes are meant to enhance one’s own security in an uncertain world, 
whereas offensive purposes are to change the status quo for its advantage. This dynamic 
creates a competitive security spiral, wherein insecurity and uncertainty about other’s true 
intentions causes each side to conclude that it has no alternative but to respond with similar 
measures that may cause conflict (Baylis et al 2014, pp. 95-96).   
The security dilemma operates among defensive or status quo powers whose real intention is 
to avoid costly and destabilizing competition and mutual arming (Dunne et al 2010, pp. 95-
96). The states involved are those who prefer to spend on something which will improve their 
domestic welfare and to engage in other non-military pursuits. The problem, however, is that 
it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intention with a high level of assurance, 
because intentions exist only in the minds of decision-makers. This is why security dilemma 
can be considered as a tragedy. The uncertainty each statesman has of the other’s intentions 
produces fear and suspicion that they may intend harm even though this is not always the 
case (Collins, 1999, pp. 95-97). This can lead to the implementation of policies that 
originally, were designed to guarantee protection in case of any harm, but ended up in 
diminishing such protection or security, because they unfortunately appeared threatening. 
Hertz (cited in Collins 1999, p.96) also argues that the tragic implication of security dilemma 
is that what was not initially expected to exist may subsequently cause what exactly has been 
feared most. The strong drive for security will also inevitably produce aggressive actions if 
the state either requires a very high sense of security or feel extremely threatened by the very 
presence of other strong states. As Robert Jervis (1976) writes: 
“When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too 
little - too much because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little 
because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the 
first state’s security” (pp.54-65). 
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Therefore, unless the requirements for achieving the desired level of security are met, a status 
quo power will continue to improve its military posture, which can appear threatening for 
others as it resembles that of an aggressor (Ibid). The competition among states in protecting 
their sovereignty and pursuing national interests in the international system remains constant 
as each state receives mandate to do so. Donald Nuechterlein (1976) argues that national 
interests are needs and desires perceived by one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign 
states that make up the external environment. Therefore, in understanding the foreign policy 
choices and responses pursued by states, one must first understand what constitute national 
interest and how it is determined and ultimately implemented (Hill, 2003). The national 
interest must be the ‘guiding star’ of a state’s foreign policy, a means and an end that it has to 
be placed above everything else, even above moral principles (Morgenthau, 1951). The 
highest moral principle must be survival or to regard considerations of justice as 
inappropriate because the state is entrusted with the lives and well-being of its citizens 
(Morgenthau 1952). Abiding to moral principles is considerably dangerous foundations on 
which to base foreign policies. According to Pushpesh Pant (2011) “national interest is not 
permanent, and because it sits above all individuals or institutes, it is easy for states to justify 
inhuman measures and extravagant spending on defense and to alter national attention to 
specific issues in order to justify certain decisions”. 
The contemporary security developments in the APR manifested in the “renewed tensions” 
between China and the Philippines can be best described and analyzed using the principle of 
security dilemma. The economic rise of China coupled by its rapid expanding military 
capabilities and recent policies on disputed territories and claimed features in the SCS appear 
threatening to other claimant states, such as the Philippines. The Philippines, in particular, 
perceives China’s intentions as “provocative” and even “aggressive”. The “China threat” 
brought by the growing power of China in the region, marked by widespread uncertainties 
and insecurities causes the Philippines to act defensively. The unavailability of accurate 
information or perception about other states’ real intention produces fear and suspicions 
among states, and thus exacerbates security dilemma.  However, further analysis shows that 
the condition of security dilemma is not the only factor that drives the action-reaction 
relationship between the Philippines and China. This study observes that the conflict of 
national interests of significant regional actors at play, mainly China and the US, also 
contributes to the already complex situation in the APR.    
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3. Background on the South China Sea and the South China Sea Disputes 
The SCS is situated in the Pacific Ocean occupying an approximate area of 3,500,000 km
2 
that stretch roughly from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest up to the Strait of Taiwan in 
the northeast (Banlaoi 2012). UNCLOS considered the SCS as a semi-enclosed sea, 
surrounded by six countries – China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and, 
Indonesia. It has an area of 648,000 squared nautical miles, which is twice than the area of 
the Sea of Japan (Zuo 2005). As Keyuan Zuo (2005, p. 47) describes “its hundreds of small 
islands mainly consist of uninhabited islets, shoals, reefs, banks, sands, cays and rocks are 
distributed widely in the form of four island groups and underwater features, namely the 
Pratas Islands (Dongsha Qundao), the Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao), the Macclesfield Bank 
(Zhongsha Qundao), and the Spratly Islands (Nansha Qundao)”.  
The SCS has been the area of contentions to multiple, longstanding and competing territorial 
and maritime jurisdictional claims, which placed the regional relations of various claimants 
into a great turmoil (Owen and Schofield 2011, pp. 809-822). Both Wu and Zou (2009, pp. 
29-30) observe that most problems in the SCS lie in its unique geographical features. 
However, longstanding disputes continue to emerge because of the power competition in play 
between littoral states. Robert Jervis (1978) notes that since the world is anarchic and states 
are not aware of each other’s true intentions, one may behave aggressively towards the others 
just to secure its own survival. The source of contention is not necessarily brought by the 
unique features of different island groups in the area, but of different dynamics that stimulate 
change in the stability in the region affecting the way states relate with each other. Claimant 
states began occupying some areas to which other states also claim. For instance, China 
claims the sole ownership of Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank. However, the Philippines 
lays its territorial claims over the Scarborough Reef, which is believed to be also part of the 
Macclesfield Bank (see Figure 1).  
Both China and Vietnam contest for control of the Paracel Islands despite the fact there have 
been no political or military tensions have been noted between them due to the firm control of 
China. All of the claimant states, with the exception of Brunei, have sought to justify their 
sovereignty claims over the disputed islands in the SCS by occupying some of the insular 
features; Vietnam occupies 21 features, the Philippines 9, China 7, Malaysia 5 and Taiwan 1 
(Banlaoi 2012). Such occupations range from constructing different facilities to the stationing 
of military troops on sub-surface features. Some constructions held on disputed areas include 
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sea walls, typhoon shelters for fishermen, piers, landing docks, lighthouses, civilian amenities 
and barracks, helicopter landing pads and airstrips capable of handling large military 
transport planes, and even the provision of clean water supplies and telecommunications 
networks (Schofield & Storey 2009, pp. 1-42). The Philippines-China relation exemplifies 
how tensions emerged due to complex political situations surrounding the SCS territory.    
 
Figure 1: Areas of Disputes in the South China Sea 
 
 
3.1  The Philippines – China Island Disputes  
According to Zuo (2005), the Spratly Islands is the most controversial island group in the 
SCS. It is an unusual event in the history of international relations to see ongoing disputes 
even to this date, and involves claimant states, mainly China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, the 
Philippines and Brunei. The Spratly Islands is approximately 90,000 square miles of the 
southern SCS and comprised of a great quantity of small islands, islets, shoals, rocks and 
coral reef features (Prescott & Schofield 2001, pp.58-61). The multilateral disputes over the 
Spratly Islands roughly include 230 features of small islands, islets and coral reefs, although 
confusion is inevitable concerning the varied estimates on the number of islands making up 
the Spratly group (Fravel 2012). These land features were firstly inhabited in 1950s by 
Taiwan, whereas the last occupation happened in 1999 by Vietnam and Malaysia (Ibid, p. 
 21 
 
34). China, including Taiwan and Vietnam lay claim to “most of these features” and insist 
their incontestable sovereign rights; Malaysia claims 12, the Philippines 53, while Brunei 
claims only 1 of the Spratly Islands (Ibid). Apart from Brunei, all of the claimants maintain a 
military airstrip or guard post on at least part of their occupied areas.  
The claims of various countries over the Spratly Islands are based on two main reasons: an 
ancestral discovery and the conventional law of the sea under the UN charter. However, 
many issues over the Spratly Islands demonstrating competing maritime security interests 
have evolved throughout the years. These interests includes claims to territorial sovereignties 
over islands and coral reefs, claims to exclusive rights to develop maritime resources, free 
navigation on the high seas, and the consequences of ongoing military mobility and naval 
modernization in the region (Fravel 2012; Dutton 2011). Issues of overlapping boundaries 
and sovereignty over ocean areas of the Spratly Islands in the SCS inevitably suggest that the 
disputes could trigger military conflicts that could undermine the peace and security in the 
Pacific region. 
The most proactive claimant in the region is China whose economic development became a 
determining factor on its external policies. The claim of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) is based on history, asserting that its discovery of the islands in the SCS can be traced 
back during the Han Dynasty in 2 B.C (Haberer cited in Advincula 2014, p. 57). Reflected by 
the “nine-dotted line/dash map”, PRC shows that it claims sovereignty to almost all of the 
SCS. The area included within the “nine-dashed line” overlaps with EEZ, islands and 
territorial waters claimed by the Philippines and so of other claimant states’ (Strategic 
Comments 2012, pp. 5-7). PRC’s “nine-dashed line” was drawn in 1946 and first published 
in 1947 by the Kuomintang government of the Republic of China to assert its SCS claims 
(Ibid). However, for some reasons China made changes and the term “nine-dashed line” was 
recently re-used in 2009 when PRC submitted a diplomatic note to the United Nations, 
suggesting that China has “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the SCS and adjacent 
waters” (Zuo 2012). 
By the end of the Cold War, China began occupying the Mischief Reef (Meiji Jiao) in 1995, 
a reef which is also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines. Mischief Reef is within the 
Philippine-claimed 200-nautical mile EEZ and sits on the Philippine-claimed continental 
shelf. The Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef drew international attention as “it marked 
the sea-change that is occurring in the geopolitical environment of the SCS” (Daojiong & 
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Valencia 2001, pp. 86-103). China’s activities in the SCS appear “provocative” and 
“offensive” in the eyes of its less powerful neighbours. Given the fact that the last violent 
clash between China and another claimant state (Vietnam) happened in 1988, the Mischief 
Reef incident became significant, because China got engaged once again in a military 
confrontation with a member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) other 
than Vietnam (Daojiong & Valencia 2001, p.87).  
The Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef created strong resistance, especially from the 
Philippines who argued that China’s activities are considerably the ‘most serious external 
challenge to the Philippine sovereignty and national security’ (Lim 1999, p.62). The 
helplessness of the Philippines during China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef was very 
apparent. The absence of another power that could contain China intensifies the Philippines’ 
vulnerability. However, China counter-argues that constructed structures were meant only for 
civilian purposes, particularly to serve as resting places for Chinese fishermen. But some 
evidences show that China carried on in expanding its structures in Mischief Reef using 
armed military supply ships in late October 1998 while ignoring more protests from the 
Philippines (Daojiong & Valencia, p.89).  
Through the efforts of ASEAN in maintaining regional stability and enhancing mutual trust 
and cooperation between China and ASEAN member states, the Mischief Reef dispute 
between the Philippines and China calmed down with the signing of a “code of conduct” by 
both parties in 2002. This aimed to formalize their rejection of the use of force in resolving 
their conflict (Banlaoi 2012, p. 63). But because of its non-binding nature, the 2002 Code of 
Conduct failed to help resolve the problem. This resulted to the de-escalation of tensions, 
which served as major sources of maritime security dilemma among claimant states to this 
date. Manila continue to argue that as a party to UNCLOS, China is obliged to respect the 
rights of the Philippines to exercise qualified jurisdictions over features that fall within its 
200-nautical mile EEZ. In addition, the Philippines contends that China’s assertion in the 
SCS is illegitimate based on the international law.  
The Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef marked the beginning of the Philippines’ vocal 
criticisms about China’s activities in the South China Sea. In response to what it perceived as 
an “intrusion” of China to its claimed territory, the Philippine government is moving forward 
with preparations for an enhanced US military presence on its soil reflected from its strong 
military alliance with the United States.  The instability involving the Philippines could also 
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affect important, if not vital, security and economic interests of the US. The extent to which 
China pursues its interests in the SCS with the help of its strong economy and military force 
will always be constrained by various factors, particularly by the global role of the United 
States. 
 
3.2 The Philippines’ Strategic and Economic Interests in the South China Sea 
Territorial disputes in the SCS have been exaggerated with the possession of important 
natural resources, which have influenced the Philippines to hold tightly onto its claims in the 
Spratly Islands. Amongst the other main concerns of the Philippines in the Spratly Islands is 
of economical advancement. The SCS is strategically significant for the Philippines because 
of the following reasons: First, the great oil reserves is a key to boost Philippine economy and 
reduce oil imports dependency; Second, great fishing capacity can address food insecurity 
and bloom into a million dollar industry and; Third, securing the freedom of navigation 
provides a gateway in achieving national development and security.  
 
Figure 2: The Philippines’ Total Petroleum and other Liquids Production per Calendar 
Year (2011-2014) 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014, viewed 9 September 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=PHL) 
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Figure 3: The Philippines’ Total Petroleum and other Liquids Consumption per 
Calendar Year (2012-2013) 
 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2014, viewed 9 September 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/country.cfm?iso=PHL 
 
According to the US Energy Information Administration or EIA (2014), the Philippines 
produced a total oil production of 26,000 barrels per day (bbl/d), and consumed 299,000 
bbl/d as of 2013 (see Figures 2 and 3). The country’s efforts of boosting its own domestic oil 
and gas production is so limited that it needs to rely heavily on imported crude oil and 
petroleum products amounting to 270,000 bbl/d, with which thirty-five percent of its crude 
imports originally come from Saudi Arabia and Russia (Ibid 2014).   
To date, the only operational oil platform in the Philippines is the Malampaya oil platform, 
which was discovered in 1992 and located 80 kilometers off the Coast of Palawan Island.
1
 
According to a report of the Oxford Business Group (2012), this power project is run by joint 
venture of operator Shell Philippines Exploration (45%), Chevron Malampaya (45%) and the 
state owned Philippine National Oil Company or PNOC (10%). Malampaya is only capable 
of supplying 40 percent of the total energy demands of the country’s Luzon area for another 
decade, which means that finding and securing alternative sources of hydrocarbons is a top 
priority in order to satisfy its own domestic demands (Ibid 2012; Guzman 2015). The 
                                                          
1
 For further readings about ‘Malampaya, Philippines’, see Offshore Technology website. 
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Philippines is among the developing countries in Asia whose economy is growing rapidly, 
thus it contributes to the rapid increase of global consumption of energy and other resources. 
There are reports about internationally coordinated undersea seismic surveys conducted in the 
SCS especially on disputed island groups like the Spratlys. For instance, Vietnam and China 
signed a production sharing contract with Mobil Corporation and partners seeking to explore 
the 1 million acre Block 22 in the SCS, 175 miles off Vietnam in 1994 and a South Korean 
based company also signed two contracts with China to conduct 20 seismic surveys and drill 
exploration wells in the Pearl River Mouth Basin in the SCS (Oil and Gas Journal 2015). 
The EIA released a promising report in 2014 stating that “the SCS is believed to contain 11 
billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable 
reserves” (EIA 2014; Agustin 2012). The Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (2013) 
on the other hand, released a report with an estimated amount of 125 billion barrels of oil and 
500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in undiscovered resources of the SCS, but US experts 
have otherwise viewed such figures as exaggerating (Lowther 2013). Meanwhile, other 
reports suggest that most of these resources are likely located along the Reed bank, in which 
China, Taiwan and the Philippines quest for sovereignty (Ibid).      
With the discovery of large amounts of potential oil reserves under the sea territory it claims, 
the Philippines hopes to reduce its strong reliance on imported oil and to benefit significantly 
from future possible oil income, which is also viewed as a great means of poverty eradication 
and strengthening its economy. In 2014, the Philippines, consequently, begun to lay its plans 
of seeking bids from foreign investors to explore resources in areas northwest of Palawan 
Islands and Recto Bank (or internationally called Reed Bank), which is part of the disputed 
territories in Spratly Islands (The Guardian 2012). All the drillings and exploration works by 
the Philippines ignited a new contention with China over exploration rights and were 
suspended by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) on that same year (Tubadeza & 
Rivera 2015). The Philippines could possibly generate large oil production amounting up to 
39,000 bbl/d by the year 2019, if there were no delays to any of their operations, making 
them as one of the major oil producers in Southeast Asia (Energy Information Administration 
2014). 
Adding to the potential oil and gas reserves, the SCS has considerable high diversity of 
marine organisms, including coral reefs, mangroves and sea grasses, and was also proved to 
be one of the world’s richest fishing grounds in the world (United Nations Environment 
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Programme 2015). Despite of incidents of widespread illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing around its area, the SCS is home to forty percent of the world’s tuna, making fisheries 
bloom into a multibillion dollar industry (Hachigian 2015). Furthermore, Alan Dupont (cited 
in Billo and Jing 2015) notes that “around the Spratly waters alone, the fishing capacity is 
estimated at 7.5 tons per square kilometer per year, whereas claimant states produce over 8 
million metric tons of live weight of marine fish, accounting to 10 percent of the world’s total 
catch” (pp. 20-25). This is consequently fundamental to the food security of coastal 
populations. The Philippine fishing industry contributes an estimated 1.8 percent (or 
equivalent to 196 billion Philippine pesos) to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
2012, and exports fish and fishery products amounting to 1.2 billion US dollars (USD) in 
2013 (Food and Agriculture Organization 2015). Given the potential fishing capacity of its 
claimed territories, the Philippines could benefit greatly from the available resources.   
Another aspect of the maritime security involves the freedom of navigation, notably the sea 
lines of communication that passes through the Taiwan Strait in the north and Malacca Strait 
in the south. According to Christopher Joyner (1999, pp. 53-108) and Robert Kaplan (2015) 
the SCS has a geostrategic role to play in linking Asia’s seaborne trade with the rest of the 
world by being a major navigational area, in which the Strait of Malacca in particular, 
provides the shortest route linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean and thus, most of 
the world’s busiest shipping lanes pass through it (see Figure 1). There are an estimated 
number of 41,000 ships a year passing through the SCS, which is considered more than twice 
the number that pass through the Suez Canal, and nearly triple the total of ships passing 
through the Panama Canal (Ji 2001, pp.1-8). International markets, including oil and natural 
gas trade, depend on reliable and transport routes (Kupfer 2014). As of 2006, more than 
70,000 vessels carrying 15 million barrels of oil passed through the Malacca Strait (Schofield 
& Storey 2009, p.7). The peace and order in the SCS, therefore affects not only the interests 
of claimant parties but also the interests of all sea-faring states, like the US who have 
expressed its concern about the deteriorating conflict in the Pacific region (Fravel 2014, pp. 
2-3; Bateman 2015). The sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the SCS are critical to the 
energy security of global economies as they provide a crucial part of the route between key 
sources in the Middle East, Africa, Australia, as well as countries in East Asia (Schofield, C 
and Storey 2009, pp.7-8). 
For an archipelagic state like the Philippines, the freedom of navigation in the SCS serves as 
a gateway to achieve national development and security when its navigational rights are 
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pursued (Banlaoi 2012). Aileen Baviera (cited in Banlaoi 2012, p. 27) notes that “with the sea 
lines of communication in the SCS, around 40,000 fishing vessels and 20,000 other 
commercial vessels navigate in Philippine waters”. But the Strait of Malacca and the SCS are 
more preferred by shippers and mariners for the reason that Philippine shipping straits and 
passages are too long to take, narrow and the waters serve as homes to rich fisheries and 
marine biological diversity that if used extensively could only endanger navigators and 
marine creatures (Ibid 2012; Caminos 2014, pp.201-204). 
 
  3.3 The Claims and Bases of the Philippines in the South China Sea 
Almost all of the claimant countries felt compelled to laying out the basis of their respective 
territorial and jurisdictional claims over the SCS that will strengthen their stand in the midst 
of contentions. However, some of these bases are not exempted from international criticisms. 
The Philippines made claims of a historic nature of the Spratly Islands, while at the same 
time invoking the rules laid out in UNCLOS. 
The Philippines is an archipelagic state with more than 7,000 islands, which can be found in 
Southeast Asia in the western Pacific Ocean between the Philippine Sea and the SCS. The 
Philippines mainly based its claims to the islands upon the discovery by a Filipino 
businessman and explorer Thomas Cloma in 1947 (Katchen 1977), who asserted his 
discovery as terra nullius, which means that any territory is not a subject to the sovereignty 
of any state, and can only be acquired through conquest or by voluntary abandonment or 
transferring a territory by a prior sovereignty (Katchen 1977, pp. 1179-1180). The Philippines 
argues that under the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan had renounced its sovereignty 
claims over the Spratlys without reassigning them to any state. Banlaoi (2012) notes that this, 
apparently, led to the occupation and claiming of Cloma (p. 23), to which he proclaimed the 
53 geographical features in Spratly Islands as “Free territory of the Freedom land” or 
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) on May 1956 (see Figure 4). This event was followed by the 
proclamation of former Philippine Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Garcia stating that 
KIG belongs to the Philippines due to its proximity to Palawan Island. When such 
proclamation was made public by the Philippine media, Merliza Makinao (cited in Banlaoi 
2012, p.24), argues that Taiwan and China, along with other countries having interests in the 
islands protested to Philippine government and reportedly laid their respective claims and 
began sending naval contingent to patrol the Spratly Islands.   
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The Philippines formally laid claims in the SCS on June 11, 1978 by Presidential Decree 
(PD) 1596 of then President Ferdinand Marcos incorporating some islands in the Spratly 
archipelago into the Philippine territory and asserted that the Spratly Islands are dangerous 
and disputed (Katchen 1977; Bautista 2009; & Banlaoi 2012, p.24). Thereby, it could be 
consolidated only by occupation. The PD 1596 clearly indicates the position of the 
Philippines that despite of the interests of other claimants to some areas of the Spratlys, their 
bases could not predominate that of the Philippines on legal, historical and equitable grounds 
(Banlaoi 2012, p.24). Given such context, the Philippines is said to be basing its claims upon 
history, indispensable need, proximity, as well as effective occupation and control (Ibid).  
Table 1: Features in the KIG Currently Occupied by Philippine Civilians and Military 
Personnel (Source: The Philippine Navy) 
Philippine Name International Designation Chinese Designation 
Lawak Island Nanshan Island Mahuan Dao 
Kota Island Loaita Island Nanyue Dao 
Likas Island West York Island Xiyue Dao 
Pag-asa Island Thitu Island Zhongye Dao 
Parola Island Northeast Cay Beizi Dao 
Panata Island Lankiam Cay Yangxin Shazhou 
Patag Island Flat Island Feixin Dao 
Rizal Island Commodore Reef Siling Jiao 
Ayungin Shoal Second Thomas Shoal Ren’ai Ansha 
 
 
To date, the Philippines is claiming sovereignty over the Scarborough Shoal, also known as 
Bajo de Masinloc,
2
 which is also claimed by China and Taiwan and a portion of the western 
section of the Spratly archipelago situated within the SCS belonging to KIG (see Table 1). 
Bajo de Masinloc is a large coral reef which lies off the coast of the Province of Zambales, 
                                                          
2
 The term was originally taken from an 1899 map of the Philippine islands, or “Mapa General, Islas Filipinas” 
by Observatorio de Manila, which means Shoal of Masinloc, or also locally known as Panatag Shoal. 
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whereas KIG was incorporated as a municipality of Palawan Province in1978, to which nine 
of its islands and reefs currently host Philippine civilians and troops, and are believed to be 
both economically valuable and strategically important for purposes of Philippine national 
security (The University of the Philippines 2013, pp. 3-4). 
Another basis of the Philippines’ claim is the principle of geographic proximity and the 
principle of the 200 nautical mile EEZ embodied in UNCLOS, which has also gained 
widespread acceptance by almost all of the claimant countries.
3
 The EEZ refers to an area 
beyond and adjacent to the “territorial sea” of any state,4 where a state may exercise 
sovereign rights on the exploitation, exploration, conservation and managing of the natural 
resources. The Philippine claims over the KIG in the Spratly Islands falls within the EEZ of 
the Philippine archipelago”. As Dato Mohammad Alwi (1991, p. 5) has argued “the 
proximity of the largest island of KIG, which is the Pag-asa Island, is approximately 280 
nautical miles to Palawan Island, while Bajo de Masinloc or the Scarborough Shoal is only 
124 nautical miles from the main archipelagos’ coastline”. These corresponds to the stand of 
the Philippines that the territory belongs to them and are relevant to its national defence and 
security (Catley 1997, pp.98-99). 
Another dimension on the basis of maritime claims of claimant countries is the sovereign 
rights over the “outer” or “extended” continental shelf areas extending beyond the 200 
nautical miles limits of EEZ in the SCS. This right is governed by Article 76 of UNCLOS, 
which gives coastal States the opportunity to establish and secure the outer limits to the their 
continental shelf rights by submitting information that comply with the techincal 
requirements issued by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). The 
CLCS eventually examines all submitted information pertaining to the proposed outer limit of 
a particular state’s continental shelf before making any recommendations pertaining to a 
“final and binding” outer continental shelf limits (UNCLOS Art. 76(8)). The Philippines 
consistently argues that the Spratly Islands is undisputedly within its extended continental 
shelf located between its established EEZ and 350 nautical miles from EEZ (the limit set 
forth in Art. 76(6) of UNCLOS). The Philippines claims that a series of treaties dating from 
                                                          
3
 To date, 162 countries and the European Union have joined the Convention. 
4
 As part of the rights and obligations of States in UNCLOS maritime zones, a coastal state is entitled to 
exercise full sovereignty over a belt of sea adjacent to its coast as its “territorial sea”, which may extend up to 12 
miles from the coast.  
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1898, 1900 and 1930, which they coined as “Treaty Limits”5 defines the territorial borders 
and all the waters belonging to the territorial sea of the Philippines. Likewise, delimited areas 
are clearly marked, forming a polygon-shaped line around the main Philippine Archipelago 
(see Figure 4), indicating the boundary lines of the Philippine national territory (Bautista 
2009, pp. 369-371).  
 
Figure 4: Map of the Philippine National Territory as Defined by Existing Laws and 
Treaties 
 
Source: The Journal of Comparative Asian Development 
 
Within the polygon-shaped line, the Philippines is claiming sovereignty and jurisdiction over 
the islands and the territorial sea adjacent to the island located inside the polygon-shaped line, 
but not over the waters inside the line (United Nations General Assembly 1961). The 
Republic of the Philippines (2012) argues that apart from the islands lying within the 
Philippine Treaty Limits treaty lines, the Philippines also claims sovereignty over the 
Scarborough Shoal. On the other hand, the international community, including the United 
States who was a party to the 1898 Treaty, denied such historically inspired claims and 
                                                          
5
 The “Treaty Limits” is established under the three international treaties, namely the 1898 Treaty of Paris that 
transferred sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago from Spain to the United States, the 1900 Cession 
Treaty between the US and Spain, and the 1930 Convention between the US and Great Britain that delimits the 
boundary between North Borneo and the Philippine Archipelago. 
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justifications of the Philippines. In response to international objections, the Philippines 
vowed to allign its domestic legislation with UNCLOS to the UN Secretary General, wherein 
such harmonization took place after more than two decades of domestic deliberation. The 
Philippine government faced a dilemma of establishing within the international community of 
states its rightful claims over the islands of Spratlys while exhausting its efforts to align its 
national and legal policy frameworks with those of the international law, such as UNCLOS. 
The Philippines hopes to portray an image that ensures the respect for international rules and 
norms, including the disputed areas.  
Following the submissions to the CLCS, the Philippines enacted the new Philippine baselines 
law Republic Act 9522 on March 10, 2009 as part of the government’s efforts to align the 
national and legal policy frameworks on the various maritime jurisdictional zones with 
UNCLOS (Roach & Smith 2012, pp. 211-213). The new Archipelagic Baselines Act 
indicates the rejection of the Philippine Treaty Limits claim and rather comply with the 
technical archipelagic baselines set out in UNCLOS.
6
 The submissions of new information of 
the Philippines and the other claimant states, like China, Vietnam and Malaysia further 
intensified the already complex and competing maritime claims. Yet, efforts on resolving 
overlapping claims and delimiting maritime boundaries lie solely to coastal states in question 
and not through or by the CLCS. Eventually, the Philippines’ submission of the New 
Archipelagic Baselines Act had resulted to domestic political and constitutional problems as a 
petition in the Philippine Supreme Court was submitted by members of the Center for 
International Law, international law expert Merlin Magalona and other law students, aimed at 
seeking for the nullification of the new baselines law for violating the constitutional 
definition of the national territory of the Philippines (Bautista 2009; Dacanay 2011). 
Petitioners have argued that “the Baselines Law violated Sections 7, 8 and 16 of the 
Constitution, which mandates that the Philippine government should highly consider national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interests and self-determination in its pursuit of an 
independent foreign policy…” (Raymundo 2011). At this point, the Philippines was 
challenged of securing a more definite and a well-constructed territorial boundaries that can 
be recognized internationally. The conflict between the provisions on the national territory by 
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and UNCLOS became a restriction to the development of 
                                                          
6
 It is also believed that the new baseline Act was initiated by the former Philippine President Arroyo for the 
fear of being impeached after signing the Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), a tripartite agreement with 
China and Vietnam, in which critics have labeled as “unconstitutional” and a “swap” for concessional loans by 
China to the Philippines.  
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strategic foreign policy initiatives that would have advanced the country’s national interests, 
particularly on issues related to the delimination of Philippine national borders. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court later affirms the constitutionality of the new Baselines Laws in 2011 
despite of the petition to nullify it. The Office of the Solicitor General (cited in Raymundo 
2011) argues that “the revised Philippine baselines further widens the Philippine maritime 
areas”, and the adherence to UNCLOS strengthens the Philippines’ claims over territories in 
KIG and Scarborough Shoal (Ibid 2011; Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign 
Affairs 2015).  
Meanwhile, the provision enclosed in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea that all 
littoral states can demand an EEZ of 200 nautical mile measure from the coastline practically 
increases tensions among claimant states, as such provision has caused a number of disputes 
over maritime delimination. The terminology employed in the delimination provisions of 
UNCLOS is controversial and vague. Therefore, it is inevitable that the interpretations of 
texts by parties may diverge from its original meaning. Moreover, by setting out a clear 
provision concerning what to demand by littoral states while undermining the significance of 
setting out mechanisms on how to settle a disputed EEZ only confirms the fragility of the 
Convention. The strong desire of every claimant states for the international recognition of 
their respective territories has further ignited previous conflicts over maritime claims.  
Although the Philippines have exhausted all efforts to align its national legislations with the 
international regime, the confusion whether ‘historical rights’ over disputed territories is 
considerably valid or not, introduces more serious consequences. Such confusion has fueled 
the Philippine government’s measure in seeking an arbitration at the Arbitral Tribunal of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration against China’s excessive maritime claims. This will be 
further discussed in the analysis. 
 
4. Analysis 
This chapter discusses as to how and why the Philippine economic and political relations with 
China are largely influenced both by the systemic and domestic level dynamics. This chapter 
focuses on the administrations of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (20001-2010) 
and President Benigno S. Aquino III (2010-2016), but key issues related to the SCS disputes 
are also analyzed, namely the Philippines, China and US triangle relationship, the 
construction of threat and uncertainty exacerbated by security dilemma and China’s rise, and 
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the implication of China’s Mischief Reef occupation to the revival of the US-Philippines 
alliance.  
 
 4.1 The Philippines, China and the United States Relations 
This section presents the Philippines’ relation with China and the US. It also discusses 
significant international and domestic political dynamics in the contemporary history of their 
triangle relationship that have influenced the foreign policy of the Philippines in the SCS. I 
argue that the US, China, Philippines triangle is an important strategic relationship in the 
contemporary international politics. 
The rich and colorful relations between China and the Philippines can be traced back to the 
pre-colonial period (Lim 1999). Benito Lim (1999, pp. 3-4) and Aileen Baviera (2000) found 
that by  the time the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in the 16th century, regular trade and 
cultural contacts between Filipinos and Chinese were already established. Chinese settlers 
and their descendants in Manila played a significant role in the colonial economy for 
centuries. As Lim (1999) and Baviera (2000) noted, this continued even after the Philippines 
gained its independence from the United States in 1946 under the Treaty of Manila. The 
diplomatic relation between China and the Philippines was sealed by a Joint Communiqué on 
June 9, 1975 in Peking, China, which highlighted their strong commitments in maintaining 
good relations and peaceful co-existence whenever possible (Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China 2015). According to Lim (2000), the Philippines was one of the first Asian 
democratic countries to open diplomatic relations with a communist country, like China 
during the Marcos government. President Ferdinand Marcos initiated a new policy aimed to 
accelerate Philippine trade with other Asian and socialist countries in order to counter the 
impacts of the then deteriorating Philippines-US trade relations (Lim 1999, pp.6-13). Such 
initiatives of President Marcos strengthened the country’s strong ties with China, particularly 
on areas of trade and migration that they both have had for centuries. 
The Chinese immigrants, who roughly represent over one percent of the Philippines’ current 
population, have predominantly take control almost sixty percent of the Philippine market 
(Pedrosa 2015). They continue to play an important role in the Philippines-China relations, 
especially when most of them became naturalized Filipinos after 1975 (Ibid).
 As China’s 
economic influence began to expand throughout the Asian region, Thomas Lum (2012, pp. 
21-22) has observed that “China also became the Philippines’ major trading partner and an 
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important financer of infrastructure projects in the country with support coming from the 
Filipino and political business interests”. The results of a 1995 study by the Philippine-China 
Development Resource Center (cited in Hongfang 2002, pp. 35-61) concludes that most 
Philippine resident Chinese had invested into series of projects since 1975 amounting to 700 
million USD, while such projects are operated by PRC nationals. The China-Philippines 
economic cooperation has been extended in other forms, like contracted projects, labor 
cooperation, air services and agricultural technology developments. And the major 
breakthrough is the opening of Metrobank Philippines in Shanghai and Bank of China in 
Manila in years 2001 and 2002 (Ibid, p. 43-46). In this way, the two governments are able to 
carry out direct transactions without necessarily transiting through a third party bank (Ibid). 
The political economy of the China-Philippines relations remained stable since then. The 
good economic relations between two states produce good political relations. As Katherine 
Barbieri (2002, pp. 22-27) observes “economically interdependent states are less likely to 
resort to the use of force when a conflict strikes, because the benefits of trade each country 
yields is reduced”. A disruption of trade resulted from a conflict can also lead to a reduction 
in a state’s welfare if for instance, benefits of trade impact other things, like domestic groups 
that must adjust to the resulting trade disputes (Ibid). Evidently, no incidents of violent 
clashes were ever recorded in the history of the Philippines-China relations despite of their 
strengthened occupations on disputed islands during earlier periods, as both parties have 
chosen to settle their disputes through diplomatic means and pursued developing mechanisms 
that strengthened their economic bilateral relations. “The Philippines took its own pursuit of 
détente with China to prioritize its own economic considerations”, as noted by Daojiong and 
Valencia (2001). 
Meanwhile, the Philippines was the only US former colony in Asia (between 1896 and 1946), 
and has long been the US’ closest and strongest ally. Their post-war relation was bounded by 
the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), which commits both states to advancing their 
security and military ties against any forms of invasion or attacks hampering their national 
sovereignty. As Former Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo (cited in Banlaoi 2012, p. 
48) describes, “the US-Philippines alliance is bound by common interests that ensure the 
peace and security in the APR”. The hosting of the Philippines to the US’ largest military 
bases abroad for over four decades, namely the Clark Air Base in Pampanga and the Subic 
Naval Base in Zambales symbolizes their enduring relationship. However, the bases were 
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closed down in 1991 to accommodate domestic demonstrations and national pride.
7
 Within 
the framework of the treaty alliance, the Obama administration continues to support programs 
that aim to strengthen the capacity of the Philippine military defense in countering both 
internal and external threats. The most recent one is Obama’s plan of giving two more ships 
and military aid to help Manila in its patrols and guarding of disputed islands in the SCS 
(Memoli & Cloud 2015).   
After the 9/11 attack, former President Arroyo declared her support to Washington’s global 
war on terror. Her government welcomed American troops in the Philippines while allowing 
them to use facilities at the former US military bases and conduct joint military trainings with 
the Philippine Armed Forces. Meanwhile, De Castro (2010, pp. 701-704) explains that the 
Philippine government’s eagerness to finally put an end to the lifelong security challenge in 
Mindanao, perpetrated by Muslim insurgents who were also suspected to have connections 
with global terror groups. Having this in mind, the Arroyo government aligned its strategic 
national interests with those of the US without necessarily damaging its relations with China. 
As De Castro (2010, p. 708) has explained, “US war on terror and China’s emergence as an 
economic and political power in the 21
st
 century can bring favourable developments to the 
Philippines”. De Castro explains that “the millions of dollars coming from the American 
economic and military aid in support for the global war on terror campaign have contributed 
to the Philippine government’s efforts in curbing the problem with insurgencies, while the 
economic rise of China can open doors for the Philippines to improve its bilateral relations, 
thus bringing high economic income on their part”.  
On the part of the Philippines, the Arroyo government is faced with the immediate threat 
posed by the rise of terrorism. The Arroyo government’s response to such external threat 
derives from a selection of a grand strategy based on the combination of how rapidly a 
balance needs to be constructed and what are the constraints in the realization of such 
strategy. As explained by Mark Brawley (2010),  “when systemic pressures dominates and a 
state detect that threat, its response is dependent to the constraints and opportunities it faces 
both in the system and domestic levels”. Timing is also critical in this situation. Therefore, 
instead of maximizing its national power well to prepare for a threat that might grow in a 
                                                          
7
During the unrestrained periods of the US-Philippines Military Base Agreement, the prostitution in the 
Philippines increased tremendously, and US military troops contributed to the economic boom of sex trade 
industry including sex trafficking of women”. This social phenomenon, in conjunction with the threat that the 
bases pose to Philippine national security and sovereignty, became an increasingly persuasive argument used by 
the anti-bases forces.  
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decade’s time, the Arroyo government take advantage of both opportunities, which includes 
the improvement of its bilateral relations with China and  to avail the military assistance from 
the US. In assessing a state’s foreign policy, it is important to look at how state leaders rank 
their national interests under a given time and resources. As Robert Ark (2003, pp. 45-47) 
observe “security in terms of protecting the state’s homeland from attack, invasion conquest 
and destruction, is the one vital interest of a state”. And since Muslim insurgencies in 
Mindanao Island are still prevalent then Arroyo’s support for the global war on terror 
campaign is more important. On the other hand, what is interesting about US troops is the 
extent to which it is not shared by the average Filipino citizens. Members of nationalist forces 
continue to oppose defense and security programmes with the United States that could lead to 
the reopening of former US military bases in the country, as well as “demanding the 
government to create an ‘independent foreign policy’ that will not bow down to the  influence 
of a formidable US” (Dangla 2015). China, on the other hand, has some anxieties over the 
US’ pivot to Asia, but its improved relations with the Philippines are still important.   
While the Philippines is taking advantage of the military support it receives from the US, an 
unfortunate international event in 2004 has led to the souring of the US-Philippines relations. 
It is evident that the Philippine security relations with the US largely influence the conduct of 
its external affairs. A number of US-led wars have been supported by the Philippines, 
including the Korean War, Vietnam War and Iraq wars in 1991 and 2003, wherein the 
Philippines even sent a peacekeeping contingent of 51 personnel to show support to the US-
led coalition in Iraq (Advincula 2015, p. 55; Tyner 2005, pp. 103-104). In 2014, Esmaquel 
reports that “the Philippines also offered to help the US on its ongoing battle with the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants that have reportedly been recruiting members from 
Southeast Asia”. The involvement of the Philippines in the US-led coalition in Iraq, however, 
resulted in a crisis in 2004 as the Arroyo government pulled out its troops in exchange for the 
freedom of an Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) who was held hostage by the Iraqi militants 
(Glanz 2004). The Philippines suffered international criticisms, particularly from the US who 
had expressed dismayed over Manila’s action. As Banlaoi (2012) narrated, “the US 
considered the Philippines’ action as a “betrayal” to their joint commitments to the security 
alliance and the “war on terror” (p.50). Such incident resulted in the cold treatment of the US 
towards the Philippines despite of the latter’s attempts of seeking diplomatic talks to 
convince the superpower that their reaction was brought by domestic political considerations, 
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in which consequences could have been worst and threatened the survival of the government 
in power in case the kidnapped migrant worker’s life was compromised (Ibid).   
Why this domestic political consideration so important and how did it manage to influence 
the Philippine government to compromise its commitment to its treaty ally during the US-led 
war in Iraq? As of 2013, there are more than ten million Filipino migrants and workers or 
OFWs spread out throughout the globe (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 
2013). OFW remittances are credited for the Philippines’ economic growth, thus protecting 
their rights and welfare is part of the pillars of the Philippine foreign policy. In the height of 
domestic deliberations concerning which strategy to select between giving pardon to the life 
of a Filipino migrant or honoring the US-Philippines alliance, the government is faced with 
great domestic constraints from the masses, mostly from OFWs and other interest groups. 
The immense domestic pressure led Arroyo to take a very challenging decision. Norrin 
Ripsman (cited in Lobell et al 2009) notes that domestic political actors can largely influence 
the nature of the legislature’s influence on policy-making. If for instance, President Arroyo 
has chosen to support the US’ interests, the government’s rhetoric will inevitably influence 
the perception of the Filipino public, especially the OFW groups. The most likely dominant 
perception is that the government is incapable of protecting the interests of its citizens or any 
member of a powerful group that contributes largely to the country’s economy.  Therefore, 
President Arroyo knew that to compromise an OFW’s life means endangering the survival of 
her own government. Ripsman explains that “a national leader whose power is largely 
vulnerable to falling down resorts to take riskier decisions in order to secure itself 
domestically”.  
The Arroyo government has managed to secure itself domestically, but has cost its relation 
with the US. What is interesting here is that both China and the US has strategic roles to play 
in the survival of the Philippines. However, the competitive relationship between China and 
the US, inevitably affects the Philippines’ affairs with either of them. This triangle is 
strategically important but also a complex one. Following the souring of US-Philippines 
relations, China takes advantage of such event to improve its bilateral relations with the 
Philippines and to advance its stance in the SCS. In other words, this incident apparently 
becomes another power vacuum that China fills within the US-Philippines relations during 
the Arroyo administration.  
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  4.2 A Security Dilemma: China’s Rise and the Construction of Threat and Uncertainty 
One of the most significant events in the history of international relations in the 21
st
 century 
is the rise of China. This development continues to gain international attention as both 
scholars and the public mainly focus on the profound implications of and policy responses to 
China’s rise. The economy of China has been growing at an impressive pace since the early 
1980s, to the extent where its high GDP growth made it to pass Japan to become the second 
largest economy. Experts believe that China will continue to expand at a similar rate over the 
next few decades. As Martin Feldkircher and Iikka Korhonen (2014, pp.61-62) observed “the 
miraculous growth of Chinese economy has been fuelled by buoyant investments and 
likewise, with strong growth in exports”. In the event of the 2008 global financial crisis, a 
substantial reduction in foreign demands for Chinese exports made its historic downfall, but 
China maintained to keep its healthy growth rates (Li et. al 2011). It was also evident that a 
steady outpouring of China’s trade integration with the world economy has been 
accompanying its economic growth (Feldkircher & Korhonen 2014). David Barboza (2010) 
reports that a study on China’s global economic share illustrated that “China’s trade 
integration in Asia, especially with Japan bounced from 10 percent in 1995 to 25 percent in 
2011, whereas countries like the US, India, Brazil and Russia rose from below 5 percent to 
around 10 percent and an approximately 5 percent growth with other European countries”. 
Furthermore, as Elisabeth Economy (2005) noted “China is a destination of choice for 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and trade by its neighbours in the APR, while China’s ODA 
is flowing freely to countries, such as Laos, Burma, Cambodia and the Philippines”. 
According to the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank (cited in Landingin 2010, pp. 
87-94), China is one of the Philippines’ biggest sources of ODA. These suggest that with 
China’s economic success, it can also pursue greater roles in the region or even global. 
The economic development of China appears to be changing the design of the international 
system. China now possesses all the means to assert its foreign and security policy within 
Southeast Asia where its growing economic and military might are strongly felt. Following 
his idea of the “Chinese dream”, which realizes the nation’s great rejuvenation, President Xi 
Jinping had announced China’s biggest rise in military spending (Kuhn 2014). As Michael 
Martina and Greg Torode reported in 2014, the Chinese government had increased its defense 
budget by 12.2 percent to 808.23 billion yuan or equivalent to 131.57 billion USD, making 
this “double digit” hikes in the defense budget next to that of the US. Earlier this year, China 
announced that a 10 percent increase on their defense budget, roughly translate to 890 billion 
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yuan or about 145 billion USD, should be expected (Pike 2015). “The increased defense 
budget also constitutes the advancement of fleet of fighter jets, ships, a defence missile 
system, the making of China’s sole aircraft carrier combat, as well as the construction of an 
underground submarine base on Hainan Island located in the SCS” (BBC News 2011).  
Having mentioned the remarkable development of China’s economic power followed by its 
military modernization, I argue that the impressive increase in China’s defense budget 
brought by its tremendous economic growth generates anxiety and concern to the Philippines’ 
own national security. Given the fact that nobody in the region is growing their defense 
budget at similar rates of China’s, fear and suspicion grow. The “double-digit” growth 
attracts international attention, merely causing threat to China’s rivals in the SCS. However, 
China insists that the consistent increased military spending is in accordance to their long-
term modernization plans. As written in the 2015 defense white paper entitled, China’s 
Military Strategy, the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC provides some insights on the 
strategic goals of the People’s Liberation Army by insisting that: 
 “China’s national strategic goal is to complete the building of a moderately 
prosperous society in all respects by 2021 when the Communist Party of China 
celebrates its centenary… It is a Chinese dream of achieving the great rejuvenation of 
the Chinese nation. The Chinese dream is to make the country strong. China’s armed 
forces take their dream of making the military strong as part of the Chinese Dream. 
Without a strong military, a country can neither be safe nor strong... to realize 
China’s national strategic goal and implement the holistic view of national security, 
new requirements have been raised for innovative development of China’s military 
strategy… and in response to the new requirement of safeguarding national security 
and development interests, China’s armed forces will work harder to create favorable 
strategic posture… and provide a solid  security guarantee for the country’s peaceful 
development.” 
Contrary to the Western and other claimant states’ thinking that China’s military 
modernization is a reflection of its strong desire of becoming the next great power in Asian 
region, China argues that it only hopes to impose development on areas where it has been 
weak. China realizes the significance of building a strong military force that will help to 
defend and achieve possible national strategic goals necessary in securing the national 
security and development interests of its nation. As what Robert Art (2003) had explained, 
“the military power of a state is important in advancing the vital and highly important 
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interests of the state”. China, at some point, lacked resources to improve its military muscles 
and when its economy began to stabilize, it invests more in building the military forces. It is 
typical for any state to find a balance between its strengths and weaknesses depending on the 
resources available in meeting certain ends. This is what Waltz (1979) has referred to as 
“internal balancing”, which means that states’ internal efforts, such as increasing economic or 
military capability, also increases their chances of survival in an uncertain world”.  
China may have no real intention of going into war, or to efficiently and effectively employ 
its military power to force other states to do what that state does not do or does not want to do 
under normal conditions. Rather, it is the anarchical structure to which states operate, as 
explained by Mearsheimer (2014), which pushes China to ensure its own survival. 
Mearsheimer reminds states not to depend to other states or institutions their own survival, 
and China, just like most realist states in Asia is aware of this dilemma. China is aware that in 
the international system, security is an expensive commodity and there is no guarantee that 
any state can avoid war in the future. Thus, China has to invest in building up its armed 
forces, which can help in securing its nation’s survival. 
But aside from making its national strategic goal of modernizing and increasing its military 
power into a reality, China has also foreign policy objectives in the SCS that needed to be 
pursued. Remember, China’s strategic interests in the SCS are similar to that of the 
Philippines; that is to take advantage of the economic benefits that the rich oil area of the 
region may contribute to its own development. The increasing demand of finding alternative 
resources that will help boost one’s economy results to the intensification of power 
competition between claimant states. However, by looking at the disparity of China on areas 
of economy, military, political and diplomatic influence compared to its rivals in the SCS 
conflict, China is more likely to overpower them. China’s greatest advances in the region 
mainly have come in the economic realm. Nevertheless, as Morgenthau (1948) has explained, 
“having great material capability in comparison to others does not necessarily prevail in a 
conflict since there are other non-material factors that may alter the conflict in the favour of 
the weak counterpart”. Among these factors may include strategy, ideology, political will, or 
psychological elements, such as national will and morale, national character, leadership and 
the degree of national integration (Ibid). 
The question in mind is: given China’s real intention is of defensive purposes, has it managed 
to secure a balance in pursuing all of its foreign policy objectives in the SCS while attempting 
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to realize its Chinese dream? If so, why China’s neighbours are being haunted by the shadow 
of fear and uncertainty? I argue that to certain extent, China has failed to secure a balance in 
pursuing its foreign policy objectives in the SCS and ensuring its neighbours, as well as the 
US who is known to be a major provider of security guarantee for other states, that they have 
no intention of causing or de-escalating tensions in the region. This absence of balance has 
exacerbated the security dilemma in the region.  Manifestly, China’s implemented policies 
were originally designed to guarantee protection in case of future possible harm, but the 
tragic implication was that this has sent a wrong signal to other forces in the region. As 
Baviera (2001, p. 80) observed that “with China’s economic stability and confidence that 
support its increasing military might, China is now capable of reclaiming territories that were 
perceived to have been lost during its weaker periods in its history”. This observation can be 
related to China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef and the military standoff that happened in 
Scarborough Shoal between China and the Philippines (Aljazeera 2012). Cheng and Paladini 
(2014) describe that “China has resorted to “assertive” actions to strengthen its territorial and 
maritime claims in order to satisfy the domestic nationalist sentiments” (p. 195). China’s 
current constructions of artificial islands, light houses, military shelters and its strong 
presence of military vessels on and near the disputed islands create a signal to the Philippines 
and other claimant states, as well as the US that China intends to have long-term plans in the 
SCS. The US has adopted an offshore balancing strategy in order to maintain its stand in the 
Pacific region. In addition, China’s increasing seizure of Vietnam fishing boats and detention 
of their fishermen in 2009, harassing of the US navy surveillance ship operating in the SCS 
on that same year and intimidating a Philippine oil exploration ship near the Spratlys in 2011, 
were incidents that have marked in the minds of other regional actors, making them suggest 
that China has other intentions apart from what it claims as “peaceful development” (Ibid). 
Again, we recall that the theory of neoclassical realism introduces the importance of key 
international events is constructing patterns that guides the perceptions of states when making 
decisions.   
By looking at the lack of coherence between China’s “peaceful” rise and its assertions 
towards less powerful claimant states in the SCS, China’s assertions exemplify the 
maximization of the power gap between itself and its neighbours. Power gap maximization is 
a tactic of great power states, according to the realist account, when states usually want to 
obtain additional power that can best guarantee their survival in the international arena. 
Mearsheimer (2006, pp. 160-162), whose works involved the prediction of China’s future as 
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the world’s next superpower concludes that “China is likely to dominate Asia the way the US 
have dominated the Western Hemisphere”. He added that just like a typical great power state 
whose works remain undone unless it achieves regional hegemony, China’s rise will remain 
unpeaceful as the current US hegemon will do what it takes to tame the aspiring one.  
The accessibility to credible information about states’ real intentions in their dealings with 
other states is very limited to the extent that policies originally built to ensure their own 
protection ended in the diminishing of other’s security, thus considered as a tragedy. The 
Philippines has much weaker economy and poorly equipped military compared to China. And 
in the height of China-Philippines territorial and maritime tensions in the SCS, the 
Philippines can hardly be expected to put up an effective defense of its claims in the Spratlys, 
especially when China decides to use force. The closing down of the US military bases in the 
Philippines in 1991 had left the Philippine government the greatest responsibility of ensuring 
its own security and defense.  
 
4.3  Mischief Reef Incident Helped Revived US-Philippines Alliance 
The assertive behaviour of China in the SCS since the 1990s has left a negative legacy in the 
Sino-Philippines relations. The vulnerability of the Philippines to the sudden external threat 
posed by China has resulted in complex domestic deliberations among key decision-makers 
as to how the Philippines should behave towards the perceived threat. In the events of 
territorial and maritime conflict in the SCS, the Philippines is confronted by the apparent 
probability of direct military confrontation with China following the Mischief Reef incident. 
As Richard Fisher (1999) has observed, “the lack of defense cooperation between the 
Philippines and the US created a power vacuum that China has been exploiting in recent 
years”. What this power vacuum means is that the departure of the US forces from the 
Philippine bases since 1992 also resulted in the suspension of the US-Philippines military 
cooperation, and China has taken such opportunity to advance its interests in the SCS. As 
Mearsheimer (2006) has explained, an aspiring hegemon like China will do what it takes to 
dominate a particular region, especially when the dominant power is absent. And because the 
US, who maintained regional order in Asia for decades, has pulled out its troops from the 
Philippines, Mearsheimer states that China saw that window of opportunity to use its military 
might to disturb the structure. 
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China’s air and naval forces are way superior to those of the Philippines. China’s ongoing 
military modernization is a critical element that drives its approach and gives greater 
flexibility to enforce its claims in the SCS. The 1987 Philippine Constitution pronounces the 
Armed Forces to protect the sovereignty of the state and the integrity of the national territory, 
but since the Armed Forces of the Philippines is amongst the weakest and outdated in the 
world, the National Security Council has to take the lead in formulating policies, relating to 
or with implications on the national security. The National Security Council of the 
Philippines is composed of the President, Vice-President, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the 
Executive Secretary and the Secretary of mostly significant government agencies, such as of 
National Defense, Justice, and Local Government (Philippine Constitution 1987). The 
complex domestic deliberations amongst Philippine officials resulted in an important 
realization about the strategic role of the US as a status quo power. The Philippines realizes 
that under the more assertive stance of China over the Philippines in the SCS, the role of the 
US in maintaining the balance of power between China and the Philippines is crucial.  
For the Philippines, the US should intervene in the dispute as reflected in the Articles IV and 
V of their 1951 MDT. Article IV of the MDT says that “an armed attack on either the US or 
the Philippines is also dangerous to the security of the other party, whereas Article V says 
that “an armed attack on either of the Parties includes an armed attack on the metropolitan 
territory of either of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction…” But the 
disagreement between the Philippines and the US about the interpretation of the 
aforementioned articles of MDT became the ultimate constraint for the Philippines’ strategy 
policy against China. As Stanley Meyer (1996) described, “for Washington, Spratly Islands 
are not part of the Philippines’ metropolitan territory and at any rate, claims on these islands 
were yet established before MDT was signed”. Therefore, this lack of agreement in the 
interpretation of the provision under MDT has served as a constraint in the security policy of 
the Philippines. Meanwhile, for China, such disagreement is favourable because the 
willingness and the probability that the US will go against China’s own policies in the APR is 
low or limited. Neoclassical realism states that the level of willingness to support a strategy 
determines the kind of policy to be pursued and the level of its impacts.  The US, however, 
maintained that its treaty obligations will be honoured without speculating any specific 
response (Ibid).   
Philippine officials began negotiating an agreement that would establish the legal rights of 
US forces and ships to operate on the Philippine territory. As Banlaoi (2012) observed, “the 
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Philippines can no longer host foreign military bases after the US as it violates the Philippine 
Constitution”. Having the greatest constraints on the Philippine Armed Forces and the 
disagreements in the interpretations of the Articles IV and V of the MDT by both Parties, 
Philippine officials have no choice but to take advantage of its alliance with the United States 
through intelligence sharing, US advices, military trainings and military material aid. In this 
manner, the US comeback does not necessarily outweigh the authority of Philippine laws, but 
its commitments to the MDT are met. As Fisher (1999) has observed, “among those who 
have embraced the comeback of US forces in the Philippines was the former President Joseph 
Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001), who also voted to close down the US bases when he was still a 
Senator in 1992”. Interestingly, the Philippine public had also shown its support for the 
comeback of more US troops in the country, though somewhat less anti-US forces remained 
strongly nationalistic (Social Weather Station 1999). The perception of the public was largely 
influenced by the growing threat perpetuated by China’s aggression and presence in southern 
Spratlys, adjacent to the mainland Philippines, but it did not necessarily mean that Filipinos 
were less critical of the United States. Neoclassical realism explains that high level of 
external threats creates a coalition among domestic forces that inevitably counter that threat. 
Eventually, the VFA between the Philippines and the US was ratified by the Philippine 
Senate in 1999 despite of recurring cycles of domestic protests against less anti-US forces. In 
addition, this was followed with a large scale US-Philippine military annual exercise called 
Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) that was arranged in February 2000, aimed at stimulating 
the security relations of the two countries in the midst of increasing “China threat” (Glaser 
2012).   
In the context of the VFA, the Philippines has transformed a military agreement into a 
deterrence against China’s aggression in the SCS by inviting more US troops in the country. 
Indeed, VFA is a military exercises agreement, but the way China perceives such agreement 
determined the nature of its behaviour towards the Philippines. Neoclassical realism explains 
that perceptions matter in the assessment of threats and opportunities, thus affects the kind of 
policies to pursue externally. The calculated deterrence of the Philippines, which is to cause 
alarm on China paid off when China became relaxed with its approaches towards the 
Philippines after VFA was ratified. As William Tow (cited in De Castro 2007, p. 2) has 
observed, “from 1996-2000, Beijing had been very careful in insisting its dominance in 
Southeast Asia while Chinese leaders tried to defuse the tension brought by the Mischief Reef 
with the Philippine government to the best they could”. China understood that they have no 
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match compared to the US in terms of military power in case tensions between China and the 
Philippines intensifies. The uncertainty in the US’ level of support towards the Philippines 
under MDT restricts China’s policies in the SCS, because the US refused to speculate 
specifically which policies to impose. It is obvious that without the US, China would have 
taken the Philippines for granted, but the US-Philippines alliance has transformed into a 
hedge against the changes in the regional strategic equation generated by the growing 
economic and political power of China. Despite of Washington’s statement that the US is not 
taking any side to the conflict, its national interest remains to focus on maintaining the 
freedom of navigation in the Asia Pacific region. China, however, perceives US’ involvement 
as containment to its hegemonic rise in Asia. Again, a tragedy has emerged brought by fear 
and suspicions exacerbated by conflicting national interests of states. These trends have 
gradually engendered a crisis to Sino-Philippines relations, but revived an old Philippine-US 
alliance (De Castro 2009). 
 
  4.4 The Arroyo Administration (2001-2010): Playing the “China Card” 
The Philippine foreign policy towards China has shifted into a different direction after former 
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo decided to set aside the disputes with China and endorse 
the significant role China plays in the Philippine economy and security after her state visit in 
Beijing in 2004 (Vaughn & Morisson 2006, pp. 25-26). This was followed by the signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding on defense cooperation by the Philippine Defense Secretary 
Avelino Cruz and his Chinese counterpart in Beijing, China (De Castro 2009, p. 412). As De 
Castro (2009) observes, “the former Arroyo administration was playing the “China card” in 
an attempt to gain diplomatic leverage against Washington following the pulling out of 
Filipino troops in Iraq that had upset the US in that same year”. Likewise, he adds that 
“Beijing, on one hand, was very much concerned by the revitalization of US-Philippine 
alliance that it adopted co-optive measures to drive a wedge between the two countries”.  
Structural realists, like Mearsheimer (2014) suggest that “various strategies that states use to 
shift the balance of power in their favour or to prevent other states from shifting it against 
them are critical”. He added that war is the main strategy states employ to acquire relative 
power, but for status quo states it is less likely, because the costs may outweigh the benefits. 
Therefore, driven by its strong desire of preventing the US from strategically “boxing in” 
China with its improved presence in Southeast Asia (Ibid, p. 409), Beijing tried “imitating”, 
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but in an innovative manner, the role that the US plays both in its relations with the 
Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries. As Mearsheimer (2014) noted, “imitation of 
the successful practices of rival great powers is an important consequence of security 
competition”. China perceives that the real intention of the US’ pivot to Asia is not  only to 
counter terrorism, but also to contain China’s rise and that the US is using its Asian allies, 
such as the Philippines to advance its interests in the region. China suspects that Washington 
is inserting itself too much into territorial issues when Beijing doesn’t see any threat that had 
undermined the freedom of navigation in the Asia Pacific Region (Glaser 2012, p. 86).  
As Phillip Saunders (2006) has observed, “China become more receptive in abiding regional 
norms of behaviour with ASEAN member states, provided numerous incentives in forms of 
trade concession investments and large Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Southeast 
Asia, specifically to the Philippines”. The improved economic ties of the Philippines with 
China ranked the latter as the third largest trading partner of the Philippines, with bilateral 
trade returns of 9.4 billion USD in 2003 to 23.4 billion USD in 2006 and even increased to a 
record high of 30.62 billion USD in 2007 (De Castro 2010, p.706; Ravindran 2012, p. 110). 
The Philippine agricultural and mining sectors have benefited greatly from Beijing’s 
investment of 8.75 million USD for the construction of the Philippines-China Center for 
Agricultural Technology in the province of Nueva Ecija and the Philippine-Fuhua Sterling 
Agricultural Technology Development Corporation (De Castro 2007, pp. 77-116). These 
projects were in addition to China’s biggest investments in the Philippines, the 450 million 
USD worth of rehabilitation project of the North Luzon Railway system and other 
construction projects throughout the country, which amounted to 500 million USD (Ibid, pp. 
93-94). As Roel Landingin (2010) explains, “the North Luzon railway project ( or Northrail), 
which aims to ferry over 150,000 passengers daily to and from Manila was China’s biggest 
state loan in the Philippines, making China as the fourth biggest development lender of the 
country after Japan”. From 60 million USD in 2003, Chinese concessional lending to the 
Philippines rose to 460 million USD by 2004 and went doubled to 1.1 billion USD as of 2007 
(Landingin 2010, p.90). Moreover, China also engages the Philippines in several regional 
economic forums, namely the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN-Plus-
Three (APT), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and others (De Castro 2007, p. 96).  
The massive influx of economic assistance, incentives and resources by China into the 
Philippines have exceeded beyond what America can offer. The Arroyo administration enjoys 
great advantages of “playing around” with China in the height of the spread of terrorism 
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while still pursuing diplomatic negotiations with the US surrounding the souring of their 
bilateral relations brought by the pulling out of troop’s issue. These incidents manifest what 
neoclassical realism talks about the ranking of national interests under a given domestic 
constraints. As Ian Storey (cited in De Castro, 2007) observe, “China views the US-
Philippines revived military alliance with scepticism simply because China had plans of 
countering the increased US influence over the Philippines by using its strengthened 
economic profile and stepping up security cooperation”. China has participated in multilateral 
security dialogues at both official and unofficial levels even to the extent of establishing 
bilateral security dialogues with most major countries in Asia” (Frost et al 2003, pp.4-5). The 
People’s Liberation Army provided assistance that helped improved its bilateral relations 
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. These range from several military and intelligence 
exchanges, consultation mechanisms, enhanced cooperation against terrorism and internal 
security threats, joint military exercises to the provision of 2.5 million USD worth of military 
equipments and supplies (De Castro 2009, pp. 87-91).  
Clearly, it can be observed that there has been a tremendous improvement in the bilateral 
relations between the Philippines and China since 2005, but China’s attempts of weaning the 
Philippines from its long-time ally had its own limitations. The perception about the strategic 
contribution of the US to the Philippines’ national security more than anybody else has 
dominated the minds of Philippine decision-makers. This resulted in pursuing constant 
diplomatic talks between Washington and Manila despite of the improved relations with 
Beijing. As De Castro (2010, pp. 358-359) has explained, “the Philippines applies an 
approach of “equi-balancing” in the face of an emergent China regardless of their respective 
intensifying economic ties”. Equi-balancing is not similar to the traditional offense-defense 
balance of power. Instead, “it involves a small or weak power state accepting, facilitating and 
pitting the big powers against each other in the course of any international event until they 
eventually fight each other” (Ibid). Shen (cited in De Castro 2007, p. 107) concludes that “the 
more China deepens and broadens its relations with the Philippines, the more the latter feels 
the urge of establishing a stronger and closer relation with outside powers, like the US and 
perhaps with Japan who also have territorial disputes with China”. This equi-balancing 
approach is also reflected in the Philippine foreign and security policy after 9/11, where the 
Philippine government based its policies on what it coined as “eight realities in the global and 
regional environment”, highlighting the determining influence of three regional powers, 
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namely China, Japan and US in the security situation and economic evolution of East Asia 
(Department of Foreign Affairs).  
In the given scenario, it is clear that it is hard for the Philippines to downplay its own 
economic and security relations with other regional powers, particularly with the US despite 
of the breakthroughs in its relations with China. Furthermore, uncertainty and suspicions 
about China’s real interests has never left, causing the Philippines to seek for a more feasible 
approach that weighs its means and ends. Meaning, as the Philippines seeks diplomatic 
dialogue with the US not only because they are uncertain about China’s “friendliness” as 
expressed in the influx of trade, investments and security assistance, but they see the long-
term implications of being an American ally. Such strategy of the Philippines has 
constrained, to some extent, Beijing’s attempts of spoiling the regional influence and 
superiority of the US, both politically and militarily, even if China advances in economically.  
If an economically powerful China did not manage to totally disconnect the Philippines’ links 
with a militarily powerful US or perhaps Japan, the Philippines will also be a big challenge 
for other great powers. Interestingly, Jenny Heywardd-Jones (2013) and Liselotte Odgaard 
(2003) clarify that “what fuels the “opportunistic” role of the Philippines in its triangle 
relations with China and US are due to first, the current dynamics in the US-China relations, 
in which both great powers view each other as “strategic competitors” in the Asia Pacific 
Region” and secondly, the Philippines’ status as America’s long-time ally”. The SCS conflict 
tests the loyalty and commitments of the US to its strategic allies in Asia, especially the 
Philippines. The mutual distrust between China and US is so pervasive and evident at many 
levels and this is significant for the Philippines in playing with a great power “card”. 
Nevertheless, the Philippines should always remind itself of the great danger in playing 
around with great powers in the international system, as Mearsheimer noted, “this might 
jeopardize its own security”.  
The Arroyo government entered into an agreement with China in 2004 to conduct joint 
explorations for oil and gas in contested waters. This agreement was called the Joint Marine 
Seismic Undertaking (JMSU), which viewed by the two states as part of their efforts in 
enhancing their bilateral relations. They were later joined by Vietnam in 2005 and they all 
regarded the JMSU as a “significant step in the implementation of the 2002 Declaration of 
the Conduct of Parties in the SCS” (Banlaoi 2012, p.22). However, what former President 
Arroyo thought as a “breakthrough” for the peace and security between China and the 
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Philippines in the SCS, ended in a great controversy because of strong corruption allegations 
towards Arroyo and China. As Barry Wain’s (2008) article had exposed, “President Arroyo 
entered into a hidden and unequal agreement with China to which lawmakers in Manila 
linked with a signing of the 329 million USD contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunication 
Equipment Company Limited or ZTE, one of China’s biggest telecommunication company”.  
Philippine Representative Roilo Golez (cited in GMA News, 2008) finds out that “JMSU 
agreement lacks transparency, compromises the Philippines’ national and energy security, 
and above all, it is illegal and unconstitutional as it fails to pass the approval of the Philippine 
Congress, including the basic rules that call for competitive biddings for government 
procurement contracts”. This controversy exacerbated the allegation that President Arroyo 
sold the Philippines’ territory to China in exchange of large ODA, which the Malacañang 
Palace also denied. Domestically, Filipinos vocal critiques coming from powerful sources, 
such as the public opinion, civil society, academia and more importantly the media, have 
joined forces to criticize the ZTE contract, the role of China in corruption scandals, and the 
Arroyo government and supporters (Bendell et al. cited in Lifeworth Review 2009). As 
neoclassical realism has explained, “it is difficult to neglect the influence of these domestic 
political forces on foreign policy making, as they constitute a powerful force that is contained 
in the state’s international action”. These domestic political forces insert pressure on 
President Arroyo to explain the anomalies in the government’s tie with China. As a response, 
the government (cited in Banlaoi, 2012) has explained that “the JMSU was necessary to 
manage the Philippines’ conflict with China in the SCS in a non-confrontational manner”. 
Here, the Arroyo government perceives that going into a confrontational battle with China it 
would only generate more expenses for the Philippine government, especially that the Armed 
Forces is too weak to match China’s and the US-Philippines relations is still under 
negotiation after the Iraq incident. Therefore, it is strategic for the Philippines to settle its 
disputes with China through an improved diplomatic bilateral relation. However, the 
downside part is that JMSU was signed in secrecy and was only revealed by an outsider.  
Due to the existing domestic political dynamics, the JMSU contract was never renewed and 
amounted to multiple problems both domestically and internationally. It may be viewed as an 
attempt to promote economic development, energy security for the Philippines and a tool to 
maintain good relations with China in the midst of SCS conflict, but it was designed at a 
great cost of the Philippines. The JMSU episode subsided following its expiration in 2008, 
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but remained as a big challenge in the China-Philippines relations, particularly in the 
succeeding Benigno Aquino III administration.   
 
4.5 The Aquino III Administration (2010-2016): More Troubles with China 
Since President Benigno S. Aquino III came into power in 2010, tensions over the disputed 
territories have strained the China-Philippines bilateral relations. Aquino has vowed to 
introduce reforms and transform the Philippine politics by focusing on strengthening regime 
legitimacy (Cainghog 2014, pp. 98-114; Quilala 2015, pp. 94-109). He adapts an American 
style of foreign policy, which is projected as principled, clean, and transparent and abides the 
international law, especially in handling the conflict with China. The controversy surrounding 
the JMSU Agreement in the SCS involving the Philippines, China and Vietnam served as a 
breaking point for the Aquino government to expose the corruption activities, the 
unconstitutionality of the agreement and how President Arroyo compromised the country’s 
national security in exchange of large concessional loans from China and how China 
managed to enhance its security standing in the SCS. I argue that this incident has intensified 
the Philippines mistrust and antagonism towards China and remained to be a sensitive issue 
in their bilateral relations.   
The history of the JMSU agreement, as narrated by Baviera (2012), is surrounded with the 
lack of transparency that lead to suspicions that the deal had been agreed in exchange for 
graft riddled loan from PRC. It has also been revealed that actors involved in signing the 
agreement on the part of the Philippines were not key foreign or security policy experts, like 
the DFA, the National Security Council or the Department of National Defense. Instead, they 
were consisting of House Representative Speaker Jose De Venecia Jr., the President of 
PNOC Eduardo Manalac, and President Arroyo herself (Bordadera cited in Baviera 2012). De 
Venecia has been Arroyo’s political ally for a long time and together with Manalac, they are 
both associated in oil-related activities. As explained by neoclassical realism, domestic actors 
who are unaware of the intricacies of policy environment yet intervene in security policy are 
primarily motivated by their personal domestic political motivations (Ripsman cited in Lobell 
et al, 2009, p. 172-185). In addition, some political leaders show interest in those kind of 
domestic actors so they can provide resources, either in terms of money, political support, or 
advice, that can be used either to retain power or in cases of corruption (Ibid). 
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Corruption allegations surrounding the JMSU project has caused the Aquino administration 
to publicly humiliate and sack Arroyo appointees to further reinforce the strong public 
perception that his administration is serious in its campaign for good governance. As Ronas 
(2012) finds out “the anti-corruption campaign of President Aquino III has dominated his 
reform agenda two and a half year since he came into power”.  Aquino III’s regime change 
reflected in the pursuit of filing legal charges against former President Arroyo, her relatives 
and political allies, specifically highlighting the alleged anomalies in ZTE-National 
Broadband project with China”. The Pulse Asia Survey Report (cited in Republic of the 
Philippines 2010) reveals that President Aquino III’s willingness of ending corruption in the 
Philippines has reaped high supports domestically according to local surveys held in the 
beginning of his presidency.  
Despite of the steady increase of the China-Philippines bilateral trade and investments under 
President Aquino III, the government never forgets how China strategically influenced the 
Arroyo government to cooperate and agree with the JMSU thus, advances China’s stance in 
the SCS. An Officer of the DFA (cited in Joseph de Guzman, 2014) explains that “China’s 
ODA to the Philippines is created for the purpose of advancing China’s political interests in 
the SCS and not a product of its own goodwill”. Senate President Franklin Drilon also 
exposed that an embassy official was reportedly quoted saying, “no JMSU, no Northrail” 
(Ibid). These incidents aggravate the strong willingness of President Aquino to pursue its 
battle against China.     
China on its part has been seeking for bilateral diplomatic dialogues with the Aquino III 
government, but the latter’s refusal made it impossible, leaving China to think that the 
Philippines’ attitude and approach in handling the SCS has changed as compared to the 
former Arroyo administration. As Baviera (2012) has explained, “the informal patronage 
networking in the Philippine foreign policy decision-making manifested in the JMSU 
agreement has shifted the Philippines’ behaviour towards China when President Aquino came 
into power”. Consequently, the failed JMSU has encouraged greater forcefulness from China 
towards the Philippines in the SCS.   
  
4.5.1 The Scarborough Shoal Standoff and China’s Economic Sanctions 
Another incident that exacerbated the action-reaction claim between China and the 
Philippines occurred in April 08, 2012, when an eight Chinese fishing vessels were spotted 
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by a Philippine Navy Surveillance plane anchoring along the Scarborough Shoal (Ronas 
2012, pp.196-197). The Philippine Navy warship BRP Gregorio del Pilar (PF-15) was 
immediately dispatched to conduct a marine patrol on the area. As the Department of Foreign 
Affairs (2012) narrates “the Philippine boarding team has gathered strong evidences, 
particularly the discovery of large amount of illegally collected marine resources, including 
live sharks hidden inside the vessels”. Eventually, this apprehension of Chinese vessels ended 
in the blocking of the Philippine Navy by two Chinese maritime surveillance ships namely, 
Zhonnguo Haijan 75 and Zhonnguo Haijan 84 (Bautista 2013). This incident was followed by 
another display of maritime power by China as it sends signal to the Philippines that they are 
serious in safeguarding their territories. As observed by De Castro (2012, pp. 2-12), China 
deployed its largest, most advanced and heavily armed patrol vessel called Yuzheng 310 after 
the Philippine civilian vessels went back on the area, thus China warned the Philippines not 
to complicate and further escalate the situation. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt (cited in Ratner, 
2013) describes Beijing’s engagement as a form of “reactive assertiveness”, a quick 
dispatching of maritime vessels to prevent the Philippines from apprehending its Chinese 
fishermen. China knew that the balance of power is on its side, while the Philippines is aware 
that they are engaged in a potentially and dangerous dispute with the emerging power after 
being outnumbered by Chinese vessels.  
The Scarborough standoff, apparently, has extended to China’s use of economic sanctions in 
order to exert more pressure to the Philippine government to comply with its demands of 
withdrawing its vessels from the shoal and to avoid harassing Chinese fishermen. As 
Ravindran (2012) observes, “China had imposed stricter regulations on its imports of 
Philippine bananas while travel agencies in China and Taiwan suspended tours in the 
Philippines due to Scarborough Shoal maritime dispute”. It was also during this period when 
Filipinos in Manila and Chinese in Beijing and Hong Kong held back to back demonstrations, 
expressing their sentiments over the issue (Ortigas 2012). The “anti-China bullying” 
demonstrations in Manila were, otherwise, been viewed by the government as unofficial and 
purely organized by civilians themselves (Ibid).   
The 2012 China-Philippines standoff has prompted some observers to think that China took 
advantage of its economic leverage over the Philippines in order to obtain its own political 
gain in the SCS, whereas some have reasoned that Manila’s unwillingness to withdraw from 
the Shoal had encouraged Beijing to punish the former for encroaching Chinese sovereignty, 
thus resorted to economic measures (Glaser 2012; The Asia Sentinel 2012). But what is 
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interesting here are the implications of these economic sanctions domestically that have later 
influenced the foreign policy of the Philippines towards China. It is undeniable that China’s 
economic power is way superior to that of the Philippines. However, as Hufbauer et al. (cited 
in Ravindran, 2012, p. 116) conclude that “certain aspects of the relationship of the two states 
must be taken into consideration when determining an appropriate criterion for the 
effectiveness of an economic sanction towards a target state, instead of relying solely to the 
size of one’s economy”.  
China is an important market for the Philippines although it only rank third as the country’s 
major trading partner next to the US and Japan. The 2012 report of the UN Comtrade (cited 
in Zachrisen 2005, p. 92) states that “the Philippines’ monthly Banana export to China has 
amounted to 28 million USD from January to April, 16 million USD from May to August, 
and 48 million US dollars from September to December, respectively”.  However, in 
measuring the extent of an economic sanction at the domestic level, one has to consider the 
target products and groups and their influence in the domestic political process. As Han 
Dorussen (2006) explains, “the effectiveness of sanctions also depends on the traded products 
between two states”. The Philippine Banana industry is a large industry concentrated in a 
particular region of Mindanao Islands, therefore when the sanction was imposed the 
vulnerability of Banana growers and exporters was strongly felt in the region. Also, Bananas 
are the Philippines’ second largest agricultural export product and supports the main 
economy of the Mindanao region. As reported by Kesha West (2012), “Banana growers in 
the Philippines perceive that the crisis in their industry is collateral damage from the 
territorial disputes of the government with China”. Although China has denied the direct 
connection of the SCS conflict to its imposition of the sanction, the Philippine government 
has refused to confirm that the collapse of the Banana export was due to its political tensions 
with China. Nevertheless, how target groups perceive the policy changes is more valuable in 
determining the effectiveness of the sanction. In 2012, there are about 500,000 Filipinos who 
relied greatly on the Banana industry as their main source of livelihood (Oda Zachrisen 2005, 
p. 87). The fear of losing their main source of income perpetuated Banana exporters to create 
a powerful lobby to the government. As Glaser (2012) finds out that “Philippine business 
leaders had pressured the government to put an end to their confrontational approach towards 
China in Scarborough Shoal before their businesses will totally collapse”.  
The powerful lobbying by Banana exporters contributed to the Philippines’ compliance to 
China’s demands (Ravindran 2012, p.121). The Philippine government withdraws its vessels 
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from the Shoal in line with the typhoon forecast and China followed afterwards. Neoclassical 
realism regards domestic social actors like Banana exporters as “veto players”, capable of 
obstructing the government’s goals or can shape the definition of the country’s national 
interests (Lobell et al 2009). It is also worth mentioning the influence of the nature of the 
relationship between the Philippine politics and business industries. The presence of a 
particularly strong or influential group, although they are small in numbers, can shift the 
balance either in favour of their government or of the rival state. As Ellen Palanca (cited in 
Ravindran 2012) has observed, “the Philippine political economy is dominated by a power 
oligarchic class whose influence can lessen the economic cost for China of imposing 
sanctions”.   
The other industry that was directly targeted by China’s sanction is the tourism industry. 
China and the Philippines have a strong link in terms of trade and tourism. According to the 
Department of Tourism of the Philippines, China provides about 240,000 visitors in 2011 and 
around 250,000 visitors in 2012 (Department of Tourism 2012). The tourism industry 
obviously contributes greatly to the Philippine economy. It has earnings of approximately 
11.3 billion USD as of 2014, contributing 4.2 percent to the country’s total GDP and provides 
approximately 1.2 million jobs (World Travel and Tourism Council 2015). As Ravindran 
(2012, p. 118) observes that “the tourism industry suffered around 1 million USD loss 
brought by cancelled trips of Chinese tourists in May 2012 alone”. As Carlyle (2012) finds 
out, “the travel advisory effect by China lasts for eight months, but the Philippines receives 
twice as many Chinese visitors in 2013 for a total of 426,000 tourists”. 
The denial and ambiguity seen from the side of China concerning about the true reasons 
behind its economic imposition towards the Philippines at the height of the standoff increased 
the vulnerability, not only of the Philippines as a state, but of domestic groups targeted by the 
sanction. This suggests that the impacts of the external power competition between China and 
the Philippines have forced certain domestic groups to also function in an unclear 
atmosphere. Nevertheless, as Hufbauer (cited in Ravindran 2012) explains, “the unspoken 
intentions behind the imposition of economic sanctions towards target groups are identified 
only through the sudden trade policy changes in the aftermath of a dispute“.  
China’s economic sanctions directed towards the Philippine Banana and tourism industries 
exemplify how both the external constraints and domestic actor’s influence can determine the 
foreign policy choices of the Philippines. The opportunity cost for China in implementing 
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banana import and tourist restrictions towards the Philippines is minimal, but the impact on 
targeted groups in the Philippines is very high, thus making policy compliance to China’s 
demands is more favourable to China. 
 
4.5.2   The Arbitration Case and the US’ Support 
Challenged by China’s growing economic and political power, the Aquino government has 
vowed of not backing down in advancing the Philippines’ national interests in the SCS. With 
the recent developments in China-Philippines relations brought by the disputes, the 
Philippines internationalized the solution to the disputes in a form of a lawsuit rather than 
resorting to bilateral negotiations with China. Prior to this, strong national sentiments are 
growing domestically about the belligerent rhetoric of China as reflected in its physical 
presence at the Shoal and the imposition of economic pressure to the Banana and tourism 
industries. I argue that the Arbitration case filed by the Philippines against China and the 
inclusion of the US to balance the power in the region highlight the foreign policy of 
President Aquino III. 
Neoclassical realism regards the critical role of public opinion in assessing perceived external 
threats and the kind of strategies to pursue internationally (Kitchen 2010). The Filipino’s 
trusts towards China have gone down as the 2012 SWS Survey reveals that “the net trust 
rating of China is very bad among those who very closely follow the Scarborough Shoal issue 
with a score of -52, while those following somewhat closely the issue rank China as bad with 
a score of -36” (Social Weather Station 2013). In contrast to China, the US gets a positive net 
trust rating of excellent with a score of +76 in 2010 and a very good net trust rating score of 
+62 as of May 2012 (Ibid). Other data reports also show back to back protests in Manila over 
Beijing’s aggressive activities and policies over sea claims. As Aljazeera (2012) reports that 
“about a thousand protestors lobby in front of Chinese Embassy in Manila while Beijing 
authorities gather around Manila’s Embassy in China in preparation of possible protests by 
Filipinos”. A Global Day of Protest against China was also conducted in 2013 (The Diplomat 
2013).  
The Philippines has resorted to the agreed international arbitration under UNCLOS in 2013 
as such strategy can cope with a situation in which the use of force is inappropriate (Bautista 
2014; Yu 2014). An arbitration case is a strategy that works best for weak powers since it is a 
law-based approach that diffuses the need for military solution. The neoclassical realism 
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allows the understanding of policy-choices made under the selection of grand strategic 
options resulted from strategic deliberations, choices and ideas of individuals and groups 
comprising the state (Kitchen 2010, p. 136). The bottom line is, under the series of events 
mentioned a coalition has been formed among key domestic actors that have influenced the 
design of the arbitration strategy of the Philippine government. President Aquino’s rhetoric in 
protecting the sovereignty of the Philippines in the SCS aligns with the public opinion (as 
shown in the trust ratings they give to China), as well as with the civil society (thru global 
anti-China protests). The coherent interests of domestic groups has backed up the state to act 
as a unilateral actor pursuing aims understood in terms of the country’s national interests. 
In January 22, 2013, Manila took China to a UN tribunal under Article 287 and Annex VII of 
the UNCLOS to challenge and pressure China’s claims in the SCS. As DFA Secretary, Albert 
del Rosario (2015) explains, “the Arbitration questions if maritime entitlements based on 
“historic rights” or other rights beyond those provided for the Convention itself are valid, as 
assertion and exercises of alleged “historic rights” in areas beyond its entitlements under 
UNCLOS have exacerbated the uncertainty and instability in the region”. The Philippines 
emphasizes that ‘the arbitration is a peaceful, open and friendly mechanism that allows for a 
final, rules-based and enduring resolution to the disputes in the SCS in accordance to the 
international law (Bautista 2014, p.4).  
The Philippines is exceptional among claimant states since most of them show little 
willingness to resolve their disputes by resorting to arbitration under UNCLOS for a reason 
that other claimant states do not want to jeopardize their bilateral ties with China. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs (2013) indicates that “their legal action towards China is 
based on the national interest of the Philippines and not on the action or non-action of other 
claimants”. Consequently, the Arbitration case has angered China expressing that the 
Philippines’ action violates the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties they both have 
signed (People’s Republic of China 2014). Although China insists for the settlement of their 
conflict with the Philippines on bilateral terms, China neither accepts the arbitration nor 
participates in the proceedings while questioning the jurisdiction of the International Court 
over the international community of states. 
Meanwhile, the US has given strong rhetorical support to its alliance relationship with the 
Philippines in its battle with China over the Spratly Islands. It is evident in the diplomatic and 
military support that the Obama administration has been given to the Philippines, including 
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the signing of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014 and the latest 
announcement of  the US’ 250 million USD worth of military aid to help strengthen the 
maritime capability of the Philippines, and an assurance that their alliance is strengthened by 
their shared commitment to safeguard the waters in APR and the Freedom of Navigation 
(Thayer, 2014; Moss & Nelson 2015). This implies that as the perceived threat from China 
grows, the Philippines inevitably seeks security guarantee which only its alliance with the US 
can provide. With the Philippines’ limited resources, it is impossible to meet the entire 
capability requirement needed to address the present day challenges, particularly in patrolling 
and securing its claimed territories. Therefore, bringing the US to balance the power in the 
APR is favourable for the Aquino administration. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The South China Sea dispute between China and the Philippines is a manifestation of how 
states operating in the international system continue to struggle in order to gain power that 
ultimately determines their survival in an uncertain world. These struggles are so difficult to 
tame or muted as the character of international relations amongst states varies across time and 
circumstances. In the context of the South China Sea dispute between China and the 
Philippines, the uncertainty brought by a security dilemma exacerbates the already complex 
situation between the two states. The economic rise of China coupled by its rapid expanding 
military capabilities and recent policies on disputed territories and claimed features in the 
SCS appear threatening to the Philippines. However, the Philippines perceives China’s 
activities as “provocative” and even “aggressive”. The unavailability of accurate information 
or perception about other states’ real intention produces fear and suspicions among states, 
thus exacerbates security dilemma.   
It is evident that states do not react similarly to the same objective external situations. The 
international system and a state’s internal characteristics can shape a state’s foreign policy 
and its outcomes. The SCS disputes have influenced the Philippines’ foreign policy choices 
while its domestic level dynamics intervene in the design and implementation of the 
Philippines foreign policy in the SCS. The Arroyo administration’s friendly relationship with 
China is reflected through its bilateral diplomatic relations and economic partnership despite 
of their conflict in the SCS. On the other hand, the Aquino III administration’s antagonistic 
relationship with China is reflected through geopolitics with US involvement and 
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multilateral, legal strategy at the UN Tribunal. The explanation behind the differences in the 
two administrations lies behind the role of the complex internal characteristics of the 
Philippines in setting the country’s foreign policy agendas towards China, and the 
implications of these policies. The Philippines’ domestic intervening variables, such as 
decision-making, decision-makers as to how leaders, bureaucracy, interest groups bargain 
with each other, state’s national power, different processes and certain conditions that affect 
the construction of its national interests, are all important in assessing the extent and the 
reason why the SCS disputes have impacted the economic and political relations of the 
Philippines with China. The foreign policies pursued by the Philippines towards China both 
under the Arroyo and Aquino III administrations have resulted to or have also influenced the 
behaviour of China in the international realm in relation to the SCS dispute.   
So, when looking for possible means that can help manage or eradicate the conflict between 
China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, it is important to always consider the level 
of influence of different domestic dynamics of Parties involved in the implementation of 
these means. Any domestic dynamic, regardless of its size or influence can alter the balance 
of peace and stability in the international system. 
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